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AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
EDWARD H. LEv,*

THIS

I

is an attempt to describe generally the process of legal reasoning in the field of case law and in the interpretation of statutes
and of the Constitution. It is important that the mechanism of
legal reasoning should not be concealed by its pretense. The pretense is
that the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge; the pretense
has long been under attack.' In an important sense legal rules are never
clear, and, if a rule had to be clear before it could be imposed, society
would be impossible. The mechanism accepts the differences of view and
ambiguities of words. It provides for the participation of the community
in resolving the ambiguity by providing a forum for the discussion of
policy in the gap of ambiguity. On serious controversial questions, it
makes it possible to take the first step in the direction of what otherwise
would be forbidden ends. The mechanism is indispensable to peace in a
community.
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.2 It is
reasoning from case to case. It is a three-step process described by the
doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case is
made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The
steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made appli*

Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

'The controlling book is Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (1936).
"Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole, nor like
reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars
are subordinate to the same term and one of them is known. It differs from induction, because
induction starting from all the particular cases proves.., that the major term belongs to
the middle and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term, whereas argument
by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular
cases." Aristotle, Analytica Priora 69a (McKeon ed., 1941).
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cable to the second case. This is a method of reasoning necessary for the
law, but it has characteristics which under other circumstances might be
considered imperfections.
These characteristics become evident if the legal process is approached
as though it were a method of applying general rules of law to diverse
facts-in short, as though the doctrine of precedent meant that general
rules, once properly determined, remained unchanged, and then were applied, albeit imperfectly, in later cases. If this were the doctrine, it would
be disturbing to find that the rules change from case to case and are remade with each case. Yet this change in the rules is the indispensable
dynamic quality of law. It occurs because the scope of a rule of law, and
therefore its meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will be
considered similar to those present when the rule was first announced.
The finding of similarity or difference. is the key step in the legal process.
The determination of similarity or difference is the function of each
judge. Where case law is considered, and there is no statute, he is not
bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even
in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum, and this means that
the judge in the present case may find irrelevant the existence or absence
of facts which prior judges thought important.3 It is not what the prior
judge intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the present
judge, attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should
be the determining classification. In arriving at his result he will ignore
what the past thought important; he will emphasize facts which prior
judges Would have thought made no difference. It is not alone that he
could not see the law through the eyes of another, for he could at least try
to do so. It is rather that the doctrine of dictum forces him to make his
4
own decision.
Thus it cannot be said that the legal process is the application of known
rules to diverse facts. Yet it is a system of rules; the rules are discovered
in the process of determining similarity or difference. But if attention is
directed toward the finding of similarity or difference, other peculiarities
appear. The problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat different
cases as though they were the same? A working legal system must therefore be willing to pick out key similarities and to reason from them to the
justice of applying a common classification. The existence of some facts
in common brings into play the general rule. If this is really reasoning,
then by common standards, thought of in terms of dosed systems, it is i3 But cf. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J. 16i (1930).
4 Cf. Mead, The Philosophy of the Act 8r, 92-Xo2 (1938).
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perfect unless some overall rule has announced that this common and ascertainable similarity is to be decisive. But no such fixed prior rule exists.
It could be suggested that reasoning is not involved at all; that is, that no
new insight is arrived at through a comparison of cases. But reasoning appears to be involved; the conclusion is arrived at through a process and
was not immediately apparent. It seems better to say there is reasoning,
but it is imperfect.s
Therefore it appears that the kind of reasoning involved in the legal
process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is
made. The rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules
arise out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the
rules and then applies them. But this kind of reasoning is open to the
charge that it is classifying things as equal when they are somewhat different, justifying the classification by rules made up as the reasoning or
classification proceeds. In a sense all reasoning is of this type, 6 but there is
an additional requirement which compels the legal process to be this way.
Not only do new situations arise, but in addition peoples' wants change.
The categories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in order to
permit the infusion of new ideas. And this is true even where legislation or
a constitution is involved. The words used by the legislature or the constitutional convention must come to have new meanings. Furthermore,
agreement on any other basis would be impossible. In this manner the
laws come to express the ideas of the community and even when written
in general terms, in statute or constitution, are molded for the specific
case.
But attention must be paid to the process. A controversy as to whether
the law is certain, unchanging, and expressed in rules, or uncertain, changing, and only a technique for deciding specific cases misses the point. It
is both. Nor is it helpful to dispose of the process as a wonderful mystery
possibly reflecting a higher law, by which the law can remain the same and
yet change. The law forum is the most explicit demonstration of the
mechanism required for a moving classification system. The folklore of
law may choose to ignore the imperfections in legal reasoning, 7 but the
law forum itself has taken care of them.

5

The logical fallacy is the fallacy of the undistributed middle or the fallacy of assuming
the antecedent is true because the consequent has been affirmed.
6 Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, Ch. 6 (1938); cf. Pareto, The Mind and Society
§ 894 (i935); Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism, Ch. 7 (I937).
7 "That the law can be obeyed even when it grows is often more than the legal profession
itself can grasp." Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 371 (i934);
see Stone, The Province and Function of Law 14o-2o6 (1946).
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What does the law forum require? It requires the presentation of competing examples. The forum protects the parties and the community by
making sure that the competing analogies are before the court. The rule
which will be created arises out of a process in which if different things are
to be treated as similar, at least the differences have been urged.' In this
sense the parties as well as the court participate in the law making. In
this sense, also, lawyers represent more than the litigants.
Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things. It indicates in
part the hold which the law process has over the litigants. They have participated in the law making. They are bound by something they helped to
make. Moreover, the examples or analogies urged by the parties bring into
the law the common ideas of the society. The ideas have their day in
court, and they will have their day again. This is what makes the hearing
fair, rather than any idea that the judge is completely impartial, for of
course he cannot be completely so. Moreover, the hearing in a sense compels at least vicarious participation by all the citizens, for the rule which
is made, even though ambiguous, will be law as to them.
Reasoning by example shows the decisive role which the common ideas
of the society and the distinctions made by experts can have in shaping
the law. The movement of common or expert concepts into the law may be
followed. The concept is suggested in arguing difference or similarity in a
brief, but it wins no approval from the court. The idea achieves standing
in the society. It is suggested again to a court. The court this time reinterprets the prior case and in doing so adopts the rejected idea. In subsequent
cases, the idea is given further definition and is tied to other ideas which
have been accepted by courts. It is now no longer the idea which was commonly held in the society. It becomes modified in subsequent cases. Ideas
first rejected but which gradually have won acceptance now push what
has become a legal category out of the system or convert it into something
which may be its opposite. The process is one in which the ideas of the
community and of the social sciences, whether correct or not, as they win
acceptance in the community, control legal decisions. Erroneous ideas, of
course, have played an enormous part in shaping the law. An idea, adopted
by a court, is in a superior position to influence conduct and opinion in the
community; judges, after all, are rulers. And the adoption of an idea by a
court reflects the power structure in the community. But reasoning by
example will operate to change the idea after it has been adopted.
8The reasoning may take this form: A falls more appropriately in B than in C. It does so
because A is more like D which is of B than it is like E which is of C. Since A is in B and B is
in G (legal concept), then A is in G. But perhaps C is in G also. If so, then B is in a decisively
different segment of G, because B is like H which is in G and has a different result than C.
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Moreover, reasoning by example brings into focus important similarity
and difference in the interpretation of case law, statutes, and the constitution of a nation. There is a striking similarity. It is only folklore which
holds that a statute if clearly written can be completely unambiguous and
applied as intended to a specific case. Fortunately or otherwise, ambiguity
is inevitable in both statute and constitution as well as with case law.
Hence reasoning by example operates with all three. But there are important differences. What a court'says is dictum, but what a legislature says
is a statute. The reference of the reasoning changes. Interpretation of intention when dealing with a statute is the way of describing the attempt to
compare cases on the basis of the standard thought to be common at the
time the legislation was passed. While this is the attempt, it may not initially accomplish any different result than if the standard of the judge had
been explicitly used. Nevertheless, the remarks of the judge are directed
toward describing a category set up by the legislature. These remarks are
different from ordinary dicta. They set the course of the statute, and later
reasoning in subsequent cases is tied to them. As a consequence, courts are
less free in applying a statute than in dealing with case law. The current
rationale for this is the notion that the legislature has acquiesced by legislative silence in the prior, even though erroneous, interpretation of the
court. But the change in reasoning where legislation is concerned seems an
inevitable consequence of the division of function between court and legislature, and, paradoxically, a recognition also of the impossibility of determining legislative intent. The impairment of a courts freedom in interpreting legislation is reflected in frequent appeals to the constitution as a
necessary justification for overruling cases even though these cases are
thought to have interpreted the legislation erroneously.
Under the United States experience, contrary to what has sometimes
been believed when a written Gonstitution of a nation is involved, the
court has greater freedom than it has with the application of a statute or
case law. In case law, when a judge determines what the controlling similarity between the present and prior case is, the case is decided. The judge
does not feel free to ignore the results of a great number of cases which he
cannot explain under a remade rule. And in interpreting legislation, when
the prior interpretation, even though erroneous, is determined after a comparison of facts to cover the case, the case is decided. But this is not true
with a constitution. The constitution sets up the conflicting ideals of the
community in certain ambiguous categories. 9 These categories bring along
9 Compare 'Myrdal, An American Dilemma, Ch. x (x944); Dicey, Law of the Constitution 126, 146 ( 9th ed., 1939).
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with them satellite concepts covering the areas of ambiguity. It is with a
set of these satellite concepts that reasoning by example must work. But
no satellite concept, no matter how well developed, can prevent the court
from shifting its course, not only by realigning cases which impose certain restrictions, but by going beyond realignment back to the overall ambiguous category written into the document. The constitution, in other
words, permits the court to be inconsistent. The freedom is concealed
either as a search for the intention of the framers or as a proper understanding of a living instrument, and sometimes as both. But this does not
mean that reasoning by example has any less validity in this field.
I
It may be objected that this analysis of legal reasoning places too much
emphasis on the comparison of cases and too little on the legal concepts
which are created. It is true that similarity is seen in terms of a word, and
inability to find a ready word to express similarity or difference may prevent change in the law. The words which have been found in the past are
much spoken of, have acquired a dignity of their own, and to a considerable measure control results. As Judge Cardozo suggested in speaking of
metaphors, the word starts out to free thought and ends by enslaving it.1°
The movement of concepts into and out of the law makes the point. If the
society has begun to see certain significant similarities or differences, the
comparison emerges with a word. When the word is finally accepted, it becomes a legal concept. Its meaning continues to change. But the comparison is not only between the instances which have been included under it
and the actual case at hand, but also in terms of hypothetical instances
which the word by itself suggests. Thus the connotation of the word for a
time has a limiting influence-so much so that the reasoning may even appear to be simply deductive.
But it is not simply deductive. In the long run a circular motion can be
seen. The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up
as cases are compared. The period is one in which the court fumbles for a
phrase. Several phrases may be tried out; the misuse or misunderstanding
of words itself may have an effect. The concept sounds like another, and
the jump to the second is made. The second stage is the period when the
concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by example continues to
classify items inside and out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to
make it clear that the suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.
10 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84,

94, i55 N.E. 58, 6i

(1926).
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The process is likely to make judges and lawyers uncomfortable. It runs
contrary to the pretense of the system. It seems inevitable, therefore, that
as matters of kind vanish into matters of degree and then entirely new
meanings turn up, there will be the attempt to escape to some overall rule
.which can be said to have always operated and which will make the reasoning look deductive. The rule will be useless. It will have to operate on
a level where it has no meaning.,, Even when lip service is paid to it, care
will be taken to say that it may be too wide or too narrow but that nevertheless it is a good rule. The statement of the rule is roughly analogous to
the appeal to the meaning of a statute or of a constitution, but it has less of
a function to perform. It is window dressing. Yet it can be very misleading. Particularly when a concept has broken down and reasoning by example is about to build another, textbook writers, well aware of the unreal
aspect of old rules, will announce new ones, equally ambiguous and meaningless, forgetting that the legal process does not work with the rule but
on a much lower level.
The movement of legal concepts in case law has frequently been shown
by pointing to the breakdown of the so-called "inherently dangerous"
rule.12 It is easy to do this because the opinion in MacPhersonv. Buick
Motor Co.'- is the work of a judge acutely conscious of the legal process and
articulate about it. But MacPhersonv. Buick was only a part of a cyclical
movement in which differences and similarities first rejected are then
adopted and later cast aside. The description of the movement can serve
as an example of case law. Roughly the problem has become: the potential
liability of a seller of an article which causes injury to a person who did not
buy the article from the seller. In recent times the three phases in the
movement of the concepts used in handling this problem can be traced.
The first of these begins in 1816 and carries us to 1851. It begins with a
loaded gun and ends ith an exploding lamp. The loaded gun brought liability to its owner in the case of Dixon v. Bell. * He had sent his thirteen" See 3 Mill, A System of Logic, Ch. i, § 2 (1887).
"2The concept has been used for the precise demonstration intended here: Radin, Case Law
and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 Col. L. Rev. 199 (i933);
Llewellyn, The Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 208 (1940); cf.
Pound, What of Stare Decisis? 'o Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1941). In connection with the general
problem, see also Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1946); Llewellyn,
The Rule of Law in Our Case Law of Contract, 47 Yale L. J. 1243 (1938); Llewellyn, On Our
Case Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 Yale L. J. 1 (1938); Lobingier, Precedent
in Past and Present Legal Systems, 44 Mich. L. Rev. 955 (1946); Rheinstein, The Place of
Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, ig Tulane L. Rev. 4 (z944); cf. Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 3 (I945).
'3 217 N.Y. 382, I1 N.E. 1050 (1916); see Parker, Attorneys at Law, Ch. 8 (1942).
X4r Maule & Selwyn 198 (1816).
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or fourteen-year-old servant girl to get the gun; in playing with the gun
she had shot it off into the face of the plaintiff's son, who lost his right eye
and two teeth. In holding that the plaintiff might recover, Lord Ellenborough attempted no classification of dangerous articles. He was content to
describe the gun "as by this want of care.., left in a state capable of doing mischief."'5 Thus the pattern begins with commodities mischievous
through want of care.
The pattern becomes complicated in 1837 in the case of Langridge v.
Levy, 6 where a plaintiff complained that the defendant had sold his father
a defective gun for the use of himself and his sons. The gun had blown up
in the plaintiff's hand. The court allowed recovery, apparently on the
theory that the seller had falsely declared that the gun was safe when he
knew it was defective and had sold the gun to the father knowing it was
to be used by the plaintiff. It was therefore both a case of fraud, and, in
some'sense, one of direct dealing between the seller and the plaintiff. The
example used by the court was the case of a direct sale to the plaintiff, or
where the instrument had been "placed in the hands of a third person for
the purpose of being delivered to and then used by the plaintiff."' 7 The
direct dealing point is also emphasized by the statement of one of the
judges during the argument to the effect that it would have helped the
plaintiff's case if he had alleged that his father "was an unconscious agent
in the transaction" because "the act of an unconscious agent isthe act of
the party who sets him in motion."-8
In the argument of Langridge v. Levy, counsel for the defendant had
pointed to a distinction between things "immediately dangerous or mischievous. by the act of the defendant" and "such as may become so by
some further act to be done to it."' 9 They had urged what might be considered the pattern suggested by Dixon v. Bell. But the court rejected the
use of any such distinction, although it remarked in passing that the gun
was not "of itself dangerous, but ...requires an act to be done, that is to
be loaded, in order to make it so." It rejected not only the distinction but
any category of dangerous articles, because it "should pause before we
made a precedent by our decision which'would be an authority for an action against the vendors, even of such instruments and articles as are danisIbid., at x9g.
'6 2 Meeson & Welsby 519 (1837).

Ibid., at 53'.
ISAlderson, B., ibid., at 525.

17

19 Ibid., at 528; note also the hypothetical case set forth by counsel for the plaintiff in
Langridge v. Levy reported in 6 LJ. (N.S.) Ex. 137, 138 (1837). "A case might be put of a
wrong medicine sent from a chemist, which is received by a person, and placed by him in a
cupboard, and afterwards taken by a third person, who, in consequence receives an injury.
can it be said that he has no remedy against the chemist?"
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gerous in themselves, at the suit of any person whomsoever into whose
hands they might happen to pass and who should be injured thereby. ' ' 2°
Nevertheless the category of dangerous articles and the distinction between things of a dangerous nature and those which become so if improperly constructed (which need not be the same as requiring a further act
to be done to make it dangerous) were again urged before the court five
years later in Winterbottom v. Wright.2 The court refused to permit a coach
man to recover against the defendant who had provided a defective coach
under contract with the Postmaster General. The plaintiff had been driving the coach from Hartford to Holyhead when it broke down due to some
latent defect; the plaintiff was thrown from his seat and lamed for life.
He could not recover because to extend liability this far would lead to "absurd and outrageous consequences." The court refused to discuss whether
the defective coach was a weapon of a dangerous nature, even though defendant's counsel seemed to be willing to acknowledge the existence of a
special rule of liability for that category. And as for the application of
Langridgev. Levy, in that case there was a "distinct fraud" and the plaintiff "was really and substantially the party contracting." The court refused to find similarity under the fraud concept in the fact that the defendant had sold a coach as safe when he did not know it to be in good condition, or under the direct dealing concept in Langridge v. Levy in that
"there was nothing to show that the defendant was aware even of the existence of the particular son who was injured" whereas here the coach
"was necessarily to be driven by a coachman. '' 22 The further argument
that the plaintiff had no opportunity of seeing that the coach was sound
and secure was insufficient to bring liability.
But in i851, in Longmeid v. Holliday2 3 the concept of things dangerous
in themselves, twice urged before the court and rejected, finally won out.
Longmeid had bought a lamp for the use of himself and his wife from
Holliday, the defendant storekeeper, who called the lamp "Holliday's
Patent Lamp" and had it put together by other persons from parts which
he had purchased. When Eliza Longmeid, the wife and plaintiff, tried to
light the lamp, it exploded; the naphtha ran over her and scorched and
burned her. She was not permitted to collect from the storekeeper. It had
not been shown that the defendant knew the lamp was unfit and warranted it to be sound. And the lamp was not in its nature dangerous. In discussing t4ose cases where a third person, not a party to a contract, might
recover damages, the court said:
20Ibid.,

at 530.

21Jo Meeson & Welsby

22 Ibid.,
109 (1842).

23155

at

112.

Eng. Rep. 752 (i851).
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And it may be the same when any one delivers to another without notice an instrument in its nature dangerous, or under particular circumstances, as a loaded gun which
he himself loaded, and that other person to whom it is delivered is injured thereby,
or if he places it in a situation easily accessible to a third person, who sustains damage
from it. Avery strong case to that effect is Dixon v. Bell. But it would be going much
too far to say that so much care is required in the ordinary intercourse of life between
one individual and another, that, if a machine not in its nature dangerous,--a carriage
for instance,-but which might become so by a latent defect entirely unknown, although discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, should be lent or given by one
person, even by the person who manufactured it, to another, the former should be
answerable to the latter for a subsequent damage accruing by the use of it.24

Thus the doctrine of the distinction between things in their nature
dangerous and those which become so by an unknown latent defect is announced as a way of explaining the difference between a loaded gun (which
under the rule, however, is explained as a particular circumstance) and a
defective lamp. As applied in the case, the doctrine describes the classification of the lamp as dangerous only through a latent defect and results
in no liability. But a court could have found as much direct dealing in the
purchase of a lamp for the use of the purchaser and his wife as in the case
of the purchase of a gun for the use of the purchaser and his sons. Under
the rule as stated a carriage is not in its nature dangerous.
The second phase of the development of the doctrine of dangerous articles is the period during which the rule as announced in the Longmeid case
is applied. The phase begins with mislabeled poison and ends with a defective automobile. During this time also there is the inevitable attempt to
soar above the cases and to find some great overall rule which can classify
the cases as though the pattern were really not a changing one.
It was the purchase of belladonna, erroneously marked as extract of
dandelion, which, in Thomas v. Winchester's in 1852, produced the first application and restatement of the rule announced in the Longmeid case. The
poison had been bought at the store of Dr. Foord, but it had been put into
its jar and incorrectly labeled in the shop of the defendant Winchesterprobably through the negligence of his employee. Mrs. Thomas, who used
what she thought was extract of dandelion, reacted by having "coldness
of the surface and extremities, feebleness of circulation, spasms of the
muscles, giddiness of the head, dilatation of the pupils of the eye and derangement of mind." She was allowed to recover against Winchester. The
defendant's negligence had "put human life in imminent danger." No such
imminent danger had existed in the Winterbottom case, the Court explained. This was more like the case of the loaded gun in Dixon v. Bell.
24 Ibid.,

at 755. The opinion was by Parke, B.

25s

6 tN.y- 397 (z852).
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The imminent danger category would not include a defective wagon but

it did include poison.
Looking back, one might say today.that the category of things by their
nature dangerous or imminently dangerous soon came to include a defec6
tive hair wash. At least in George v. SkivingtonW
in 1869, a chemist who
compounded a secret hair wash was liable to the wife of the purchaser for
injuries caused by the wash. But the court went about its business without explicit regard for the imminently dangerous category. It thought
that the imperfect hair wash was like the imperfect gun in the Langridge
case. It chose to ignore the emphasis in the Langridge case on the purported fact that the seller there knew the gun was defective and lied. It said,
"substitute the word 'negligence' for fraud and the analogy between Langridge v. Levy and this case is complete." And as for the case of the defective lamp where there was no liability, that was different because negligence had not been found. In constructing a pattern for the cases, it appears that loaded guns, defective guns, poison, and now hair wash were in
the imminently dangerous category. Defective wagons and lamps were
outside.
The next year it became known that a defective balance wheel for a
circular saw was not imminently dangerous. The New York court stated:
"Poison is a dangerous subject. Gunpowder is the same. A torpedo is a
dangerous instrument, as is a spring gun, a loaded rifle or the like....
Not so, however, an iron wheel, a few feet in diameter and a few inches in
thickness although one part may be weaker than another. If the article is
abused by too long use, or by applying too much weight or speed, an injury may occur, as it may from an ordinary carriage wheel, a wagon axle,
or the common chair in which we sit.1"* While applying the imminently
dangerous category to defeat liability, the New York court took occasion
to give a somewhat new emphasis to Thomas v. Winchester. It found that
"the decision in Thomas v. Winchester was based upon the idea that the
negligent sale of poisons is both at common law and by statute an indictable offense." And certainly that could be argued. At any rate, three years
later the New York court said its opinion in the balance-wheel case showed
that Thomas v. Winchester would not result in liability in a case where a
boiler blew up. 8 But the imminently dangerous category received a new
member in 1882 when the builder of a ninety-foot scaffold to be used in
painting the dome of the courthouse was held liable to the estate of an
employee-painter who was killed when the ledger gave way.2 9 Yet if a de265 L.R. Ex. 1 (i869).
27 Loop v. Litchfield, 4 N.Y. 351, 359 (1870).

28

Losee v. Clute, 5i N.Y. 494 (1873).
v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882).

29 Devlin
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fective scaffold was in, the court followed tradition in announcing that a
defective carriage would be out.
In England a defective scaffold was also put in the category. The plaintiff in Heaven v. Pender3° was a ship painter who was injured, while engaged in his work, due to the breaking of defective ropes which held his

support outside the ship. He was allowed to recover against the dock owner who had supplied the support and ropes. But the majority of the
judges decided the case on the rather narrow point that the necessary
workmen were in effect invited by the dock owner to use the dock and appliances. That could have been the explanation also for the American scaffold case. The most noteworthy feature of Heaven v. Pender,however, was
the flight of one of the judges, Lord Esher, at that time Brett, toward a
rule above the legal categories which would classify the cases.
Brett thought recovery should be allowed because:
Whenever one person supplies goods or machinery, or the like for the purpose of
their being used by another person under such circumstances that everyone of ordinary sense would, if he thought, recognize at once that unless he used ordinary care
and skill with regard to the condition of the thing supplied or the mode of supplying
it, there will be danger of injury to the person or property of him for whose use the
thing is supplied, and who is to use it, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as
to the condition or manner of supplying such thing.3r

This statement was concocted by Brett from two types of cases: first,
the case where two drivers or two ships are approaching each other and
due care is required toward each other, and second, where a man is invited
into a shop or warehouse and the owner must use reasonable care "to keep
his house or warehouse that it may not endanger the person or property of
the person invited." Since these two different situations resulted in the
same legal rule, or stated differently, since two general principles when applied resulted in the same legal rule, Brett thought there must be "some
larger proposition which involves and covers both set of circumstances."
This was because "the logic of inductive reasoning requires that where
two propositions lead to exactly similar premises there must be a more remote and larger premise which embraces both of the major propositions."
Brett's rule of ordinary care ran into some difficulty in looking back at the
Langridge case and its insistence on both fraud and direct dealing. But
Brett said of the Langridgecase, "It is not, it cannot be accurately reported," and in any event the fact that recovery was allowed on the basis of
fraud "in no way negatives the proposition that the action might have
been supported on the ground of negligence without fraud."
3o 11 L.R. Q.B. 503 (1883).
" Ibid., at 5io; see also rule as stated at Sog.
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The majority opinion in Heaven v. Pender, while proceeding on the invitee point, and while refusing to follow Brett in his flight, agrees that liability for negligence follows when the instrument is dangerous "as a gun"
or when the instrument is in such a condition as to cause danger "not
necessarily incident to the use of such an instrument" and no due warning
is given. Approving this statement, the New York court in 1908 held that
the question of a manufacturer's negligence could be left to a jury where
32
the plaintiff lost an eye due to the explosion of a bottle of aerated water.
The next year a defective coffee urn or boiler which blew up and killed a
man was permitted to join the aerated bottle in the danger concept. 33 The
coffee-urn case provided the occasion for explaining two of the names given
the dangerous category. Given an "inherently dangerous" article, the
court explained, a manufacturer becomes liable for negligent construction
which, when added to its inherent characteristics, makes it "imminently
dangerous."
The categories by now were fairly well occupied. The dangerous concept had in it a loaded gun, possibly a defective gun, mislabeled poison,
defective hair wash, scaffolds, a defective coffee urn, and a defective
aerated bottle. The not-dangerous category, once referred to as only latently dangerous, had in it a defective carriage, a bursting lamp, a
defective balance wheel for a circular saw, and a defective boiler. Perhaps it is not too surprising to find a defective soldering lamp in Blacker v.
Lake34 joining the not-dangerous class. But the English court, in the
opinions of its two judges, experienced some difficulty. For the first
judge there appears to have been no difficulty in classifying the soldering lamp as not dangerous. Yet the Skivington case caused trouble
because it appeared to suggest that negligence could be substituted for
fraud and perhaps liability would follow even though the article was not
dangerous. But in that event the Skivington case should not be followed
because it was in conflict with Winterbottom v. Wright. Accordingly, the
soldering lamp not being dangerous, it was error to leave the question of
negligence to the jury. The second judge suggested a more surprising realignment of the cases which threatened the whole danger category. He
suggested that no recovery should be permitted even though the lamp fell
into the class of things dangerous in themselves. The duty of the vendor in
such a case, he pointed out, would be a duty to warn, but that duty is discharged if the nature of the article is obvious or known, as was true in this
32 Torgesen v. Schultz,
33 Statler
34
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N.Y. i56, 84 N.E. 956 (19o8).

v. Ray, i95 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. io63 (i9o9).

io6 L.T. 533 (1912).
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case. Indeed, the Skivington and Thomas v. Winchester cases were explainable on the very ground that the articles appeared harmless and their
contents were unknown. One might almost say that recovery was permitted in those cases because the danger was only latent.
The period of the application of the doctrine of dangerous articles as
set forth in the Longmeid case and adopted in Thomas v. Winchester may
be thought to come to an end in 1915 with its application by a federal
court-the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This was the
way the law looked to the court. "One who manufactures articles inherently dangerous, e.g. poisons, dynamite, gunpowder, torpedoes, bottles of
water under gas pressure, is liable in tort to third parties which they injure, unless he has exercised reasonable care with reference to the articles
manufactured.... On the other hand, one who manufactures articles
dangerous only if defectively made, or installed, e.g., tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors hung on the walls, carriages, automobiles, and so on is not
liable to third parties for injuries caused by them, except in cases of willful
injury or fraud."' 5 Accordingly, the court denied recovery in a suit by the
purchaser of a car from a dealer against the manufacturer when the front
right wheel broke and the car turned over.
MacPhersonv. Buick36 begins the third phase of the life of the dangerous instrument concept. The New York Court of Appeals in 1916 had before it almost a repetition of the automobile case passed upon by the federal court the previous year. The plaintiff was driving his car, carrying a
friend to the hospital, when the car suddenly collapsed due to a defective
wheel. The plaintiff was seriously injured. The Buick Motor Company,
the defendant, had sold the car to a retail dealer who in turn had sold it to
tle plaintiff. The defective wheel had been sold to the Buick company by
the Imperial Wheel Company.
As was to be expected, counsel for the plaintiff urged that an automobile was "dangerous to a high degree."37 It was, in fact, similar to a locomotive. It was much more like a locomotive than like a wagon. "The machine is a fair rival for the Empire Express," he said. "This is evidenced
further by the fact that the person running an automobile must have a license of competency, equally with the locomotive engineer and by the
legal restrictions imposed by law in the use of the automobile." It was
"almost childish to say that an automobile at rest is not dangerous. Neith3sCadillac
6

221 Fed. 8oi, 803 (C.C.A. 2d, 1915).
1I1 N.E. 1050 (1gI6); see Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons

v. Johnson,

3 217 N.Y. 382,

Other than Their Immediate Vendors, 45 L.Q. Rev. 343
37 Brief for the Plaintiff 16, 17, 18.

(1929).
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er is a locomotive with the fire drawn" nor a battery of coffee boilers nor
a 42-centimeter gun. The automobile, propelled by explosive gases, was
"inherently dangerous." The trial judge had charged the jury that "an
automobile is not an inherently dangerous vehicle" but had said that they
might find it "imminently dangerous if defective. ' 38 As to the difference
between the two phrases, counsel said there was no point "juggling over
definitions. 'Inherently' means 'inseparably.' 'Imminently' means 'threateningly.' " He did not comment on the request of the defendant that the
judge charge the jury that recovery depended on the car being "eminently
dangerous."39 Counsel did write, however, that he "was powerfully impressed with a remark of Lord Chief Justice Isaacs, on his recent visit to
this country, to the effect that in England they were getting away from
merely abstract forms and were seeking to administer justice in each in40
dividual case."
The New York Court of Appeals allowed recovery. Judge Cardozo
recognized that "the foundations of this branch of the law... were laid
in Thomas v. Winchester." He said that some of the illustrations used in
Thomas v. Winchester might be rejected today (having in mind no doubt
the example of the defective carriage), but the principle of the case was
the important thing. "There never has in this state been doubt or disavowal of the principle itself." Even while remarking that "precedents
drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of
travel today," he was quick to add the explanation: "The principle that
the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to
the principle do change." And in addition there were underlying principles.
They were stated, more or less, Cardozo said, by Brett in Heaven v. Pender.
To be sure, Cardozo was not certain that this statement of underlying
principles was an accurate exposition of the law of England. He thought
"it may need some qualification even in our own state. Like most attempts
at comprehensive definition, it may involve errors of inclusion and exclusion." He thought, however, that "its tests and standards, at least in their
underlying principles, with whatever qualifications may be called for as
they are applied to varying conditions, are the tests and standards of our
law." He did not comment on the statement of Brett concerning Thomas
v. Winchester that it "goes a very long way. I doubt whether it does not go
too far."
As to the cases, Cardozo recognized that the early ones "suggest a narrow construction of the rule." He had reference to the boiler and balanceS 217 N.Y. 382, 396, iii
39Ibid.,

at 399, IO56.

N.E. zo5o, io55 (igx6).
40 Brief for the Plaintiff 23.
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wheel cases. But the way to set them aside had already been shown. They
could be distinguished because there the manufacturer had either pointed
out the defect or had known that his test was not the final one. The distinction was based upon a point unsuccessfully advanced by losing counsel in Winterbottom v. Wright. Other cases showed that it was not necessary
to be destructive in order to be dangerous. "A large coffee urn ...may
have within itself, if negligently made, the potency of danger, yet no one
thinks of it as an implement whose normal function is destruction." And
"what is true of the coffee urn is equally true of bottles of aerated water."
Devlin v. Smith was important too. "A scaffold," Cardozo pointed out, "is
not inherently a dangerous instrument." He admitted that the scaffold
and the coffee-urn cases may "have extended the rule of Thomas v. Winchester," but "If. so, this court is committed to the extension. The defendant argues that things inherently dangerous to life are poisons, explosives,
deadly weapons, things whose normal function is to injure or destroy. But
whatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once have been, it has no
longer that restricted meaning."
He showed a certain impatience for what he called "verbal niceties."
He complained that "subtle distinctions are drawn by the defendant between things inherently dangerous and things imminently dangerous." As
to this it was sufficient to say, "If danger was to be expected as reasonably
certain, there was a duty of vigilance, and this whether you call the danger
inherent or imminent." The rule was: "If the nature of a thing is such that
it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril, when negligently
made, it is then a thing of danger." But "there must be a knowledge of a
danger not merely possible but probable." Thus what was only latently
dangerous in Thomas v. Winchester now became imminently dangerous or
inherently dangerous, or, if verbal niceties are to be disregarded, just plain
or probably dangerous.
Elsewhere in commenting on the case, Cardozo seems to make somewhat less of the matter of principles. He wrote: "What, however, was the
posture of affairs before the Buick case had been determined? Was there
any law on the subject? A mass of judgments, more or less relevant, had
been rendered by the same and other courts. A body of particulars existed
in which an hypothesis might be reared. None the less, their implications
were equivocal.... The things classified as dangerous have been steadily
extended with a corresponding extension of the application of the remedy.
..They have widened till they include a scaffold or an automobile or
even pies and cakes when nails and other foreign substances have supplied
ingredients not mentioned in the recipes of cook books." Cardozo de-
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scribed the legal process in connection with these cases as one in which
"logic and utility still struggle for the mastery." 4 One can forgive Judge
Cardozo for this language. It is traditional to think of logic as fighting
with something. Sometimes it is thought of as fighting with history and
experience.
In a reversal of itself, not so striking because the membership of the
court was different, the same federal court hearing another appeal in the
same case in which it had been decided that a defective automobile was
not inherently dangerous now stated with new wisdom: "We cannot believe that the liability of a manufacturer of an automobile has any analogy
to the liability of a manufacturer of 'tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors
hung on walls.' The analogy is rather that of a manufacturer of unwholesome food or of a poisonous drug. '42
MacPhersonv. Buick renamed and enlarged the danger category. It is
usually thought to have brought the law into line with "social considerations. 43 But it did not remove the necessity for deciding cases. Later the
New York courts were able to put into the category of things of danger or
probably dangerous a defective bottle 44 and another coffee urn, 45 although
one less terrifying than the coffee boiler of i9o9. But for some reason or
other, admission was denied to a defective automobile when the defect was
a door handle which gave way, causing one of the doors to open with the
result that the plaintiff was thrown through the door and under the car.
The defective handle did not make the car a "thing of danger." 46 And if
one is comparing cases and examples, it has to be admitted that a door
handle is less closely connected with those things which make a car like a
locomotive than is the wheel on which it runs.
Nevertheless, a new freedom follows from MacPhersonv. Buick. Under
it, as the Massachusetts court has said, the exception in favor of liability
for negligence where the instrument is probably dangerous has swallowed
up the purported rule that "a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for
negligence to a remote vendee."47 The exception now seems to have the
same certainty the rule once had. The exception is now a general principle
The Growth of the Law 40-4 i , 76-78 (1924).
42Johnson v. Cadillac, 261 Fed. 878, 886 (C.C.A. 2d, i919).
43 See Torts: Liability of Manufacturer to Consumer for Article Dangerous Because of
Defective Construction, 9 Corn. L. Q. 494 (1924).
44Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 18i N.E. 576 (1932); cf. Bates v. Batey & Co.,
[1913] 3 K.B. 351.
4sHoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E. 2d 415 (1936).
46 Cohen v. Brockway Motor Corp., 240 App. Div. 18, 268 N.Y. Supp. 545 (I934).
41 Cardozo,

47 Carter

v. Yardley & Co., 31 9 Mass.

92,

64 N.E. 2d 693 (i946).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

of liability which can be stated nicely in the Restatement, and text writers
can criticize courts for not applying what is now an obvious rule of liability.

48

A somewhat similar development has occurred in England. In Donoghue
v. Stevenson 49 in 1932, the manufacturer of a bottle of ginger beer was held
liable to the plaintiff who had purchased the bottle through a friend at a
caf6. The bottle contained the decomposed remains of a snail. The opinions of the majority judges stressed the close and almost direct relationship between the manufacturer and the remote vendee. The control of the
manufacturer of this type of article was thought to be "effective until the
article reaches the consumer... . . A manufacturer puts up an article of
food in containers which he knows will be opened by the actual consumer.
There can be no inspection by any purchaser and no reasonable preliminary inspection by the consumer." Lord Atkin, while stating that Brett's
rule in Heaven v. Penderwas too broad, found that the moral rule requiring
the love of one's neighbour in law was translated into the injunction "you
must not injure your neighbour." The question then was: "Who is my
neighbour?" The practical rule evolved was of persons "closely and directly affected" and as to acts "which you can reasonably foresee would be
likely to injure your neighbour." The emphasis on control and proximity
revives the notion of the unconscious agent in Langridge v. Levy, as well
as the inability to inspect, unsuccessfully urged in Winterbottom v. Wright
and apparently implicit in the Skivington case.
As for other prior cases it was now said that the distinction between
things dangerous and those dangerous in themselves was "an unnatural
one" and anyway the fact that there might be a special duty for one category no longer meant that a duty might not exist for others. Winterbottom
and Longmeid were no longer controlling because negligence had not been
alleged and proved in those cases. And as for the Blacker case, Lord Atkin
had read and re-read it but had difficulty "in formulating the precise
grounds upon which the judgment was given." Thus prior cases were realigned out of the way despite the protest of dissenting judges who adhered to the view of the exception only for dangerous articles in the more
traditional sense.
While the emphasis was on continuing control in the Donoghue case,
and counsel urged that the Donoghue case applied only to articles intended
for internal consumption, its rule was applied in Grantv. AustralianKnitting Millsso in 1936 to underpants defective due to the presence of an irri48See Harper, Law of Torts § io6 (i933).
49 [1932] A.C. 562.

so[1936] A.C. 85.

Note the reference to trade names and:patents at 583.
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tating chemical. Here the emphasis could be more on the point that the
defect was hidden. While the Blacker case was in a sense disregarded, the
point made by one of its judges was in fact accepted. Reasoning in a manner not unlike Skivington, which substituted negligence for fraud, the
court put secrecy in the place of control. Donoghue's case was now seen
not to "depend on the bottle being stopped and sealed; the essential point
in this regard was that the article should reach the consumer or user subject to the same defect as it had when it left the manufacturer." The court
realized that in applying its test of directness, control, proximity and hidden defect, "many difficult problems will arise.... Many qualifying conditions and many complications of fact may in the future come before the
Courts for decision." But "in their Lordships' opinion it is enough for
them to decide this case on its actual facts."
With the breakdown of the inherently dangerous rule, the cycle from
Dixon v. Bell was complete. But it would be a mistake to believe that the
breakdown makes possible a general rule, such as the rule of negligence,
which now can be applied. A rule so stated would be equivalent to the
flight of Brett. Negligence itself must be given meaning by the examples
to be included under it. Unlimited liability is not intended. As the comparison of cases proceeds, new categories will be stressed. Perhaps, for example, there will be a category for trade-marked, patented, advertised, or
monopolized articles. The basis for such a category exists. The process of
reasoning by example will decide.
III

It is customary to think of case-law reasoning as inductive and the application of statutes as deductive.5' The thought seems erroneous but the
emphasis has some meaning. With case law the concepts can be created
out of particular instances. This is not truly inductive, but the direction
appears to be from particular to general. It has been pointed out that the
general finds its meaning in the relationship between the particulars. Yet
it has the capacity to suggest by the implication of hypothetical cases
which it carries and even by its ability to suggest other categories which
sound the same. The phrase "imminent danger," for example, suggested
immediacy, inherence, and eminence. To this extent, the phrase suggests
the instances to be included under it, and something like deductive reasoning occurs. The new instances will still have to be weighed with the old,
however, and the remaking of the concept word itself is apparent. It not
only comes to have new meanings, but the word itself may change or disappear. The application of a statute seems to be in great contrast. The
st Allen, Law in the Making 249 (1930).
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words are given. They are not to be taken lightly since they express the
will of the legislature. The legislature is the law-making body. It looks
like deduction to apply the word to the specific case.
The difference is seen immediately when it is realized that the words of a
statute are not dictum s The legislature may have had a particular case
uppermost in mind, but it has spoken in general terms. Not only respect
but application is due to the general words the legislature used. The rules
for statutory construction make the same point. They are words which tell
one how to operate a given classification system. The problem is to place
the species inside the genus and the particular case inside the species. The
words used by the legislature are treated as words of classification which
are to be applied. Yet the rules themselves show that there may be some
ambiguity in the words used. The words are to be construed in the light
of the meaning given to other words in the same or related statute. The
specification of particular instances indicates that similar but unmentioned instances are not to be included. But the specification of particular
instances, when in addition a word of a general category is used, may be
the indication that other like instances are also intended; hence the ejusdem generis rule.
Thus in the application of a statute the intent of the legislature seems
important. The rules of construction are ways of finding out the intent.
The actual words used are important but insufficient. The report of congressional committees may give some clue. Prior drafts of the statute may
show where meaning was intentionally changed. Bills presented but not
passed may have some bearing. Words spoken in debate may now be
looked at. Even the conduct of the litigants may be important in that the
failure of the government to have acted over a period of time on what it
now suggests as the proper interpretation throws light on the common
meaning. But it is not easy to find the intent of the legislature s3
Justice Reed has given us some Polonius-sounding advice on the matter:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than
the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often
these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislature. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning had

led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to
the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the
P But the statement of contradictory purposes may be; see Employment Act of 1946, 6o
Stat. 24 (1946) as amended 6o Stat. 838 (1946), iSU.S.C.A. §§ 1021-24 (Supp., 1947).
53See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col.I. Rev. 527 (1947).
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policy of legislation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose rather than the
literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute,
is aailable, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids the use, however clear
the words may appear on superficial examination. The interpretation of the meaning
of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function.
This duty requires one body of public servants, the judges, to construe the meaning
of what another body, the legislators, has said. Obviously there is danger that the
courts' conclusion as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by
the judges' own views or by factors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the danger is the best assurance of escape from its threat but hardly
justifies an acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the
courts available information for reaching a correct conclusion. Emphasis should be
laid too upon the necessity for appraisal of the purposes as a whole of Congress in
analyzing the meaning of clauses of sections of general acts. A few words of general
connotation appearing in the text of statutes should not be given a wide meaning,
contrary to settled policy, "except as a different purpose is plainly shown."S4

The words of advice force one to reexamine whether there is any differ-

ence between case-law and statutory interpretation. It is not enough to
show that the words used by the'legislature have some meaning. Concepts
created by case law also have some meaning, but the meaning is ambiguous. It is not clear how wide or narrow the scope is to be. Can it be said
that the words used by the legislature have any more meaning than that,
or is there the same ambiguity? One important difference can be noted
immediately. Where case law is considered, there is a conscious realignment of cases; the problem is not the intention of the prior judge. But with
a statute the reference is to the kind of things intended by the legislature.
All concepts suggest, but case-law concepts can be re-worked. A statutory
concept, however, is supposed to suggest what the legislature had in mind;
the items to be included under it should be of the same order. We mean to
accomplish what the legislature intended. This is what Justice Reed has
said. The difficulty is that what the legislature intended is ambiguous. In
a significant sense there is only a general intent which preserves as much
ambiguity in the concept used as though it had been created by case
law.
This is not the result of inadequate draftsmanship, as is so frequently
urged. Matters are not decided until they have to be. For a legislature perhaps the pressures are such that a bill has to be passed dealing with a certain subject. But the precise effect of the bill is not something upon which
the members have to reach agreement. If the legislature were a court, it
would not decide the precise effect until a specific fact situation arose demanding an answer. Its first pronouncement would not be expected to
S4United

States v. American Trucking Ass'n,

3o U.S.

534,
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(1940).
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fill in the gaps. But since it is not a court, this is even more true. It will
not be required to make the determination in any event, but can wait for
the court to do so. s There is a related and an additional reason for ambiguity. As to what type of situation is the legislature to make a decision? Despite much gospel to the contrary, a legislature is not a fact-finding body.
There is no mechanism, as there is with a court, to require the legislature
to sift facts and to make a decision about specific situations. There need
be no agreement about what the situation is. The members of the legislative body will be talking about different things; they cannot force each
other to accept even a hypothetical set of facts. The result is that even in
a non-controversial atmosphere just exactly what has been decided will
not be clear.
Controversy does not help. Agreement is then possible only through
escape to a higher level of discourse with greater ambiguity. This is one
element which makes compromise possible. Moreover, from the standpoint of the individual member of the legislature there is reason to be deceptive. He must escape from pressures at home. Newspapers may have
created an atmosphere in which some legislation must be passed. Perhaps
the only chance to get legislation through is to have it mean something
not understood by some colleagues. If the court in construing the legislation is going to look at committee reports and remarks during debates,
words which would be voted down if included in the bill will be used on
the floor or in a report as a kind of illicit and, it is hoped, effective legislation. And if all this were not sufficient, it cannot be forgotten that to speak
of legislative intent is to talk of group action, where much of the group
may be ignorant or misinformed. Yet the emphasis should not be on this
fact, but on the necessity that there be ambiguity before there can be any
agreement about how unknown cases will be handled.
But the court will search for the legislative intent, and this does make
a difference. Its search results in an initial filling up of the gap. The first
opinions may not definitely set the whole interpretation. A more decisive
view may be edged toward, but finally there is likely to be an interpretation by the court which gives greater content to the words used. In building up this interpretation, the reference will be to the kind of examples
that the words used, as commonly understood, would call to mind. Reass Cf. Frank, Words and Music: Some Reflections on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Col. LRev. 1259 (1947). Note that not every change in a court's statement of the statutory rule

need be an actual change in the construction of the statute. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. I (igi) and United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85
Fed. 271 (C.C.A. 6th, x898).
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soning by example will then proceed from that point. There is a difference
then from case law in that the legislature has compelled the use of one
word. The word will not change verbally. It could change in meaning,
however, and if frequent appeals as to what the legislature really intended
are permitted, it may shift radically from time to time. When this is done,
a court in interpreting legislation has really more discretion than it has
with case law. For it can escape from prior cases by saying that they have
ignored the legislative intent.
There is great danger in this. Legislatures and courts are cooperative
lawmaking bodies. It is important to know where the responsibility lies.
If legislation which is disfavored can be interpreted away from time to
time, then it is not to be expected, particularly if controversy is high, that
the legislature will ever act. It will always be possible to say that new legislation is not needed because the court in the future will make a more appropriate interpretation. If the court is to have freedom to reinterpret
legislation, the result will be to relieve the legislature from pressure. The
legislation needs judicial consistency. Moreover, the court's own behavior
in the face of pressure is likely to be indecisive. In all likelihood it will do
enough to prevent legislative revision and not much more. Therefore it
seems better to say that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent
has been made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap
of ambiguity, the court should take that direction as given. In this sense
a court's interpretation of legislation is not dictum. The words it uses do
more than to decide the case. They give broad direction to the statute.
The doctrine which is suggested here is a hard one. In many controversial situations, legislative revision cannot be expected. It often appears
that the only hope lies with the courts. Yet the democratic process seems
to require that controversial changes should be made by the legislative
body. This is not only because there is a mechanism for holding legislators
responsible. It is also because courts are normally timid. Since they decide
only the case before them, it is difficult for them to compel any controversial reform unless they are willing to hold to an unpopular doctrine
over a sustained period of time. The difficulties which administrative
agencies have in the face of sustained pressure serve as a warning. When
courts enter the area of great controversy, they require unusual protection.
They must be ready to appeal to the constitution.
Where legislative interpretation is concerned, therefore, it appears that
legal reasoning does attempt to fix the meaning of the word. When this is
done, subsequent cases must be decided upon the basis that the prior
meaning remains. It must not be re-worked. Its meaning is made clear as
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examples are seen, but the reference is fixed. It is a hard doctrine against
which judges frequently rebel. The Mann Act is a good example5 6
On June 25, i91o, the Mann Act, which recites that it "shall be known

and referred to as the 'White Slave Traffic Act,'" went into effect. The
Act

7

provides in part: "Any person who shall knowingly transport or

cause to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for,
or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce or in any territory
or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice or compel such woman or girl to become
a prostitute, or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other
immoral practice... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." The Act was
not passed in haste. 'Indeed, the matter was much debated and prior reports about it had been written. The Secretary of Commerce and Labor
had discussed the problem in his 19o8 report; so had an Immigration Commission in a preliminary report for i909. There were international aspects
to the problem, and a treaty had been concluded. The President had directed the attention of Congress to the need for legislation, and the proposed bill had been considered in'-majority and minority congressional
committee reports.
The Mann Act was passed during a period when large American cities
had illegal but segregated "red-light" areas. It was believed that women
were procured for houses of prostitution by bands of "white slavers" who
"were said to operate from coast to coast, in town and country, with tentacles in foreign lands, east and west and across the American borders. The
most sensational of these were said to be the French, Italian, and Jewish
rings who preyed on innocent girls of their respective nationalities at ports
of entry into the United States or ensnared them at the ports of embarkation in Europe and even in their home towns." It was thought that the
girls were young; many of them were supposed to be "scarcely in their
teens."' 8 They were forced or lured into the business. It was thought that
they had previously been virtuous, and while supposedly many of them
had been aliens, it was also believed that they represented "our" women.
Once captured, the woman disappeared from her own community, was
brutally treated, whipped with rawhide, and became, as the House Report said, practically a slave in the true sense of the word. 9
56See also for the problem of legislative intent, Radin, A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation: Western Union Co. v. Lenroot, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 219 (1045).
s736 Stat. 825 (igio), 18 U.S.C.A. § 398 (1927).

s8 Reckless, Vice in Chicago 40 (1933).
59 H.R. Rep. 47, 6ist Cong. 2d Sess. (i909).
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To meet this assumed situation, the White Slave Traffic Act made it a
crime to transport a woman "for the purpose of prostitution, or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose."
While Representative Richardson said that the bill was "impractical,
vague, indistinct and indefinite in every respect," 6° the debates show that
Congress had in mind some very fundamental issues. On one side were
those who were in favor of home rule or the powers of the states. Congressman Bartlett of Illinois was on this side. He said that he found himself
compelled to resist the enactment of a measure "like this, behind which are
gathered... so many forces of morality, piety and reform."' But in his
voting he was guided by "the great white light steadily stream[ing] out
of the Constitution,"'' and he thought that the "States still have the police powers to prevent in their borders the offenses against morality so
eloquently denounced by the advocates of this bill.... If any man lives
in a State which fails in its duty to enact such laws, I submit that under
our system of government his first duty is at home. 6 3 On the other side
were those who argued that "public health and public morals appeal to
us." They were the ones who said, "The proposed legislation is constitutional, and it is related to moral considerations of the most compelling
force. If it were not true that our penal legislation were related to moral
questions, and moral considerations, then the whole fabric of that legislation would lose its power to command the approbation of the country."6 4
They were careful to insist, however, that "the sections proposed do not
amount to an interference with the police powers of the States." 6s
In a way the bill nust surely have been about the "white-slave traffic."
Congressman Mann at the end of the debate emphasized the subject matter by declaring: "Congress would be derelict in its duty if it did not exercise [power], because all the horrors which have been urged, either truthfully or fancifully, against the black-slave traffic pale into insignificance as
compared with the horrors of the so-called 'white-slave traffic.' "66 Congressman Peters said: "The considerations which prompt the support of
this bill are so widespread and its objects are so well understood and meet
with such universal approval that no explanation or repetition of them
need be made to this House. The bill aims to aid in the suppression of the
white-slave traffic .... ,67 The majority report of the House Committee
had defined the white-slave trade as the "business of securing white wom60 45

Cong. Rec. 8io (i9io).

6r45 Cong. Rec.
6

2Ibid.

631bid.

App. it (igio).

64 45

Cong. Rec. io4o (i9io).

6s H.R.
66 45
6

Rep. 47, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., at 4 (i9o9).
Cong. Rec. 1040 (19io).

7 Ibid., at io35.
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en and girls and selling them outright or exploiting them for immoral purposes."6 8 It had stressed the international character of the trade and the
large earnings involved.
Yet while it was said that "the traffic at which this bill strikes is admitted to be abhorrent to all men," and "the time will never arrive when
there will be a change of sentiment with respect to its infamy and depravity,"6 9 there was confusion both as to the facts and as to the legislation
proposed.
For example, Congressman Richardson said he knew of the complaint
about the traffic but "it may be that there is a good deal of exaggeration
about it." Many of the situations described in the House Report had to do
with conditions in Illinois. But the "law in Illinois has been strengthened
and there had been many prosecutions under it. ' ' 7° Congressman Adamson
noted that "the Chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization... stated ... that the white slave traffic had practically been
stamped out of our large cities." An examination of the instances cited,
Adamson thought, would show that they could be handled under existing
laws. 7' And despite the descriptions of immorality, the truth was that society was getting better and "we are vastly better morally than the rest
of the world." On the other hand, Congressman Russell, as his contribution on the facts, told the House the story of a Negro who was supposed
to have purchased his third white wife "out of a group of twenty-five that
72
were offered for sale in Chicago."
Whatever the evil, presumably the legislation was molded to cure it.
The Act speaks of "prostitution," "debauchery," and of "other immoral
practice" or "purpose." So far as prostitution was concerned, the report
of the House Committee had said that "the bill reported does not endeavor to regulate, prohibit or punish prostitution or the keeping of places
where prostitution is indulged in." Congressman Adamson noted that the
purpose of the bill "is not to stamp out prostitution, nor do its advocates
so contend." He realized that many good men and women, and some good
congressmen, thought the purpose was to stamp out prostitution and immorality, but this was an error. But theHouse Report dearly said that the
bill reaches the transportation of women "for the purpose of prostitution."
And Representative Peters joined the three elements of white-slave traffic, transportation, and prostitution together in his statement that "the
bill aims to aid in the suppression of the white slave traffic by making it
68 H.R.

Rep. 47, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., at ii (i9og).

69145 Cong. Rec. Io39 (igio).
7OIbid., at 8io.

71 Ibid.,

at io3I.

72Ibid., at 821.
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a felony to purchase interstate transportation for any woman going to a
' ' 73
place for purposes of prostitution.
So far as debauchery was concerned, perhaps it was a mistake to believe that the bill looked to the protection of female virtue. Congressman
Adamson said that if it had "we would unanimously support it. But no
such pretense even is made. The only professed and possible purpose of
this legislation is to purify interstate commerce."
It was perhaps strange then that "there is no attempt to prohibit a vile
man from buying a ticket to be used by himself or another vile man for
transportation into another State for the purpose of immorality. ' '74 Nevertheless, carried to its last analysis, the proposition underlying the bill
"would endeavor to exclude all vile and impure people from the use of interstate facilities for commerce ....
There would be a wide field of different opinion as to who was vile and impure and what practices constituted
immorality." Somewhat along the same line, the minority report in the
Senate urged, "It would be intolerable that the person from whom they
purchased a railroad ticket should inquire as to the morality or chastity"
s
of the person who was to use the ticket."
Except for the charge that the provisions of the bill were "liable to furnish boundless opportunity to hold up and blackmail and make unnecessary trouble without the corresponding benefit to society,"' 76 there seemed
to be general agreement that the women involved were victims. The women were under control of keepers and were unable to communicate with the
outside world without permission. 77 It was said that the evidence "shows,
that many victims of this traffic, have been coerced into leading lives of
shame, by the use of force, deceit, fraud and every variety of trickery. In
many instances they are most unwilling victims, who are literally compelled to practice immorality, and are held to its pursuit by means of violence and restraint." 8 The House Report said that in many cases the
women "are practically slaves in the true sense of the word." Something
of the flavor of the debate is indicated by Congressman Adamson's denunciation of the idea that "woman's condition of vileness... is contagious of contact" and "the horrible falsehood that women are creatures
per se vile and immoral designed and intended in nature for no other than
immoral purposes." This was to show that women were not like diseased
animals or persons or like lottery tickets which, as a constitutional matter,
could be kept out of interstate commerce. Rather women were the "sweet
73Ibid., at 1o35.
74 Ibid., at 1033.

75Ibid., at 904 I .

76Ibid., at 1033.
77 Ibid., at 81i.
78 Ibid., at 1037.
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and lovely partners of our joys and sorrows." 79 The reporter notes applause.
There was hardly any discussion of the meaning of "other immoral
practice" or "purpose." It was known to some that in 19o8, in the Bitty
case, the Supreme Court had construed similar language in a related
statute which dealt with alien women imported for the purpose of prostitution or "any other immoral purpose" to include the importation of a
woman for the purpose of concubinage. At least it was known to Congressman Richardson who, however, thought the Mann Act unconstitutional.
He said the Court in the Bitly case had given the phrase "a broad, liberal
and wise construction in order to uphold morality."8 " The House Report
mentions the Bitty case but states that it does so "only in passing."'
The law was to apply in the District of Columbia "without regard to
'
the crossing of district, territorial or state lines. ' S2
But at least not every
congressman recognized what the application would be. Some who opposed the bill said they would be in favor of legislation "abolishing bawdy
houses in'the District of Columbia. ' '83 One who was in favor of the bill but
had been twitted for not advocating such a remedy before for the District
defended himself by saying that he was not "a self-constituted, pestiferous
reformer" 8 4 And Congressman Borland, who introduced an anti-pandering bill for the District at about the same time, stated flatly, over the objections of Representative Mann, that the Mann Act did not cover the
subject in the District but "was designed to regulate the-national part of
it... and could regulate nothing else."8 s
The Mann Act was passed after there had been many extensive governmental investigations. Yet there was no common understanding of the
facts, and whatever understanding seems to have been achieved concerning the white-slave trade, in retrospect seems incorrectly based. The
words used were broad and ambiguous. There were three key phrases:
"prostitution," "debauchery," and "for any other immoral purpose." The
Act was now ready for interpretation.
By 1913, prostitution and debauchery had been applied by the Supreme
Court.
Hoke and Economides"6 had been indicted for inducing a woman "to
79Ibid., at io33.
soIbid., at So.
S H.R. Rep. 47, 6ist Cong. 2d Sess., at 7 (I909).
82S. Rep. 866, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., at 2 (9io0). The report is almost identical with the
House Report.
8345 Cong. Rec. App. 12 (Igio).
84Ibid., at 1040.
8sIbid., at 3138.
86Hoke and Economides v. United States,
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U.S. 308 (1913).

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING

go in interstate commerce.. . for the purpose of prostitution." They
raised the question of the constitutionality of the Act. Reasoning by analogy, Justice McKenna said, "... . surely if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons,
the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from
the systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more insistently of girls." The construction, of
course, emphasized the involuntary nature of the woman's conduct, the
system involved, presumably organized traffic, and the belief that many of
the women were minors.
On the same day as the opinion in Hoke and Economides, Justice McKenna in Athanasaw v. United States17 upheld the application of the Act
through the word "debauchery" to a defendant who had caused a girl to
be transported from Georgia to Florida for the ostensible purpose of appearing as a chorus girl in a theatre operated by the defendant. There was
evidence of improper advances made to the girl upon her arrival; the advances were related to her membership in the theater group. The Supreme
Court held that debauchery as used in the Act did not mean only sexual
intercourse but "was designed to reach acts which might ultimately lead
to that phase of debauchery which consisted in 'sexual actions.' "But the
Circuit Court of Appeals said that this case and Hoke and Economides
taken together "were so strong as to amount to a direct decision on the
point" that the White Slave Traffic Act was not confined to cases of white
88
slavery.
Then in 1915 the Supreme Court apparently held that the Act was not
confined to cases where the woman was "practically a slave."8 9 The Court
had before it an indictment of a woman for conspiracy. The conspiracy
charged was between the woman and one Laudenschlager that Laudenschlager should "cause the defendant [the woman] to be transported from
Illinois to Wisconsin for the purpose of prostitution." It was urged that
since the woman could not commit the substantive crime of violating the
Mann Act, for she would be the victim transported, she could not be guilty
of conspiracy to commit that crime. But Justice Holmes held that she
could be. He did not agree that the woman victim would never be under
the prohibition of the Mann Act. He said, "Suppose, for instance that a
87 227

U.S. 326 (i913).

88Hays v. United States, 231 Fed. io6 (C.C.A. 8th, 1916); the case later became one of
the Caminetti cases.
89United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140 (1915).
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professional prostitute, as well able to look out for herself as was the man,
should suggest and carry out the journey within the act of i9IO in the
hope of blackmailing the man, and should buy the railroad tickets, or
should pay the fare from Jersey City to New York, she would be within
the letter of the act of i9IO and we see no reason why the act should not
be held to apply." Therefore "we see equally little reason for not treating
the preliminary agreement as a conspiracy that the law can reach, if we
abandon the illusion that the woman always is the victim. The words of
the statute punish the transportation of a woman for the purpose of prosstitution even if she were the first to suggest the crime."
The Court took the view that the woman could be punished over the objections of Justices Lamar and Day, who dissented in part on constitutional grounds: "Congress had no power to punish immorality." If then
the "woman could be so punished for conspiring with her slaver, the fundamental idea that makes the act valid would be destroyed. She would
cease to be an object of traffic... so as to be subject to regulative prohibitions under the Commerce Clause-but would be voluntarily travelling on her own account....
It became clear in the Caminetti cases 9° in 1917, when the Supreme
Court applied the phrase "for any other immoral purpose," that organized
traffic did not have to be involved either. The indictments considered in
Caminetti involved the transportation of women for the purpose of paid
cohabitation or for the purpose of having them become mistress and concubine. But the indictments did not involve commercialized and organized vice.
Counsel for the defendants urged against this conclusion the legislative
history of the law as well as its given title. They referred to the House
Committee Report to "demonstrate that commercial traffic alone was in
view." 9 ' They pointed to what they termed "an unofficial communication
to one of his subordinates" by the Attorney General in which they claimed
that the Attorney General said that the legislation "does not attempt to
regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution but aims solely to prevent
panderers and procurers" from plying their infamous trade. This was "the
full equivalent of saying that the law does not apply to those who indulge
their own passions merely for their own gratification, but applies solely
9
to those who engage in the trade of pandering to the passions of others."' 2
Not only was the vice not organized and commercialized, but the women
were not inexperienced victims. In one case, while there was conflicting
90
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testimony before the jury, there was some evidence that the woman was
doing the pursuing. Another case was described by counsel as follows:
* the woman was a public prostitute and made no pretense of virtue. Hays
happened to meet her at Oklahoma City while attending a cattlemen's convention
there, and after his return to his home another woman telegraphed the Oklahoma
woman to come to Kansas, sending her the money with which to buy the ticket. In
response to that message the woman went from Oklahoma City to Wichita, where she
met and entertained Hays. We may justly censure the man for associating with those
loose women, but that was the extent of his offense, for there is not, so far as the
woman in this case is concerned, a single aggravating circumstance, and yet this man
of good standing in the community where he lives, with a wife and children dependent
on him, has been sentenced to the penitentiary for eighteen months, stripped of his
civil rights, his wife deprived of his support, his boy and girl forever branded as the
children of a convict, and all for no better reason than that he made a mistake which
the State of Kansas might have adequately punished by a fine. To subject American
citizens to such punishments for such offenses will brutalize the American people in
time, and to suppose that the American Congress intended such a result impeaches its
wisdom as well as its sense of justice.93
The result would be:
*.. that for every man who can be convicted under this statute, when charged
with only an immorality, two men will submit to extortion and pay blood-money to
save themselves, their families, and their friends from the humiliation which an
exposure of their mistakes would bring.94

The prosecution placed its case on the plain meaning of the phrase
"prostitution, or debauchery, or other immoral purpose." It agreed that
"other immoral purpose" included "words of such generality that a criminal conviction thereunder could not be tolerated for acts whose purpose
was any and every sort of immorality." The words "must be limited to
that genus of which the preceding descriptions are species." The problem
was to find the genus. And the defendants' contention that the genus was
"commercialized vice" was wrong because, while prostitution involved the
financial element, debauchery did not, since it only involved "a leading of
a chaste girl into unchastity.... The nexus indicative of the genus is sexual immorality." 5 The conclusion was fortified by the Bitty case. Moreover, if the genus were restricted to commercialized vice, the class would be
exhausted by prostitution and debauchery and the words "immoral purpose" and "immoral practice" would "be rendered impotent. If the particular words exhaust the genus there is nothing ejusdem generis left, and
in such case we must give the general words a meaning outside of the
class.... )296
Ibid., at iS, ig.
94Ibid., at 20.
9SCaminetti v. United States, Brief for United States 15.
96Ibid., at 16, quoting United States v. Mescall, 215 U.S. 26, 31, 32 (1909).
9'
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It would be wrong, the prosecution contended, to resort to the title or
the legislative history.97 "It would transcend judicial power to insert limitations or conditions upon disputable considerations of reasons which impelled the law, or of conditions to which it might be conjectured it was addressed and intended to accommodate." Moreover, so far as the debates
were concerned, "the writer of a bill may explain his purpose to his fellow
members, and they may vote for it solely because in their judgment it has
a wider or narrower scope than he states."
According to Justice Day, there was "no ambiguity in the terms of
this Act." The words "immoral purpose" had been interpreted by the
Court in a related and earlier act and that interpretation "must be presumed to have been known to Congress when it enacted the law here involved." Under the Bitly case 98 "immoral purpose" included importing a
woman for the purpose of concubinage. The Act there read "that the importation into the United States of any alien woman or girl for the purpose
of prostitution, or for any other immoral purpose, is hereby forbidden."
And the Court had then said that "the immoral purpose charged in the indictment is of the same general class or kind as the one that controls in
the importation of an alien woman for the purpose strictly of prostitution.
The prostitute may, in the popular sense, be more degraded in character
than the concubine, but the latter none the less must be held to lead an immoral life, if any regard whatever be had to the views that are almost universally held in this country as to the relations which may rightfully, from
the standpoint of morality, exist between man and woman in the matter
of sexual intercourse."
The Court said it was giving effect to the "common understanding" and
"plain import" of the words which could not be changed by reference to
the House Committee report or the title. Moreover, the fact that the
"Act as it is written opens the door to blackmailing operations upon a
large scale, is no reason why the courts should refuse to enforce it according to its terms." 99
97Ibid., at ii, 12, quoting MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 308 (19o8).
98 United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393 (1o98).
99 Justice McKenna wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Chief Justice White and
Justice Clark. "Language, even when most masterfully used, may miss sufficiency and give
room for dispute. Is it a wonder therefore, that when used in the haste of legislation, in view
of conditions perhaps only partly seen or not seen at all, the consequences, it may be, beyond
present foresight, it often becomes necessary to apply the rule [of legislative intent although
contrary to the literal language]?" The report of the committee had a "higher quality than
debates on the floor of the House.... Blackmailers, of both sexes have arisen, using the
terrors of the construction now sanctioned by this court as a help-indeed the means for their
brigandage. The result is grave and should give us pause." 242 U.S. 470, 501, 502 (i9x8). As
for the Bitty case, the statute there was different. For it was an amendment to a prior statute
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At the very least, Caminelti set the direction of the Mann Act to include
more than white slavery; at most it imported into the statute all acts commonly thought to be sexually immoral. The suggested definition of "any
other immoral purpose" went far beyond the facts to include those things
which "common understanding" or views "almost universally held in this
country" would regard as immoral in the matter of sexual intercourse.
This wide interpretation seems to have been accepted by Chief Justice
Taft in a case involving the Motor Vehicle Theft Act. 00 He referred to the
Mann Act as dealing with " prostitution or concubinage and other forms of
immorality." The image of women under control of keepers had apparently disappeared. Justice Stone in 1932, while holding that mere acquiescence
by a woman would not subject her to a conspiracy conviction, said flatly, "Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases which frequently, if not normally, involve consent and agreement on the part of the
woman to the forbidden transportation."' 0' Yet the actual facts of the
Caminetti cases did involve paid prostitution or concubinage, and also, it
would be easy to argue, some form of coercion, although not the coercion
of white slavery. There was a wide difference between the facts and the
broad doctrine of all sexual immorality. A good deal of ambiguity remained.
Surely no member of the Mann Act Congress had thought about such
facts as were involved in the Mortensen case.02 It was true that the petitioners operated a house of prostitution in Grand Island, Nebraska. They
were husband and wife. But "in 1940 they planned an automobile trip to
Salt Lake City, Utah, in order to visit Mrs. Mortensen's parents. Two
girls who were employed by petitioners as prostitutes asked to be taken
along for a vacation and the Mortensens agreed to their request. They
motored to Yellowstone National Park and then on to Salt Lake City,
where they all stayed at a tourist camp for four or five days. They visited
Mrs. Mortensen's parents, and in addition, the girls 'went to shows and
around in the parks' and saw various other parts of the city. The four then
returned in petitioners' automobile to Grand Island; on arrival they drove
immediately to petitioners' house of ill fame and retired to their respecwhich prohibited the importation of any alien woman or girl into the United States for the
"purposes of prostitution." When the amendment "or anyother immoral purpose" was added,
it was necessarily an enlargement upon the former.
'o Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).

x0 Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932); the Gebardi case was strikingly 4.
local police matter.
102 Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944).
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tive rooms." It was easy to argue that at the halfway point of the trip,
namely when the journey back from Salt Lake City began, the girls were
being transported to Grand Island for an immoral purpose. It was also
easy to urge on the other side that "the sole purpose of the journey from
beginning to end was to provide innocent recreation," and in any event
the interstate commerce journey was hardly "a calculated means for effectuating sexual immorality" since, from all that appeared, leaving the
girls in Grand Island would have worked just as well. The Supreme Court
had difficulty with the case but in a five-to-four decision refused to uphold
the conviction.
The majority opinion went on the ground that the purpose of the trip
was innocent. "In ordinary speech an interstate trip undertaken for an
innocent vacation purpose constitutes the use of interstate commerce for
that innocent purpose." And surely if one thinks of the vacation category
one need not think of the immoral purpose concept. But more seems to be
implied in the vacation concept than the surface innocent purpose doctrine. There was nothing, Justice Murphy said, to show that "petitioners
forced the girls against their will to return to Grand Island for immoral
purposes." He said:
We do not here question or reconsider any previous construction placed on the
Act which may have led the federal government into areas of regulation not originally
contemplated by Congress. But experience with the administration of the law admonishes us against adding another chapter of statutory construction and application
which would have a similar effect and which would make possible even further justification of the fear expressed at the time of the adoption of the legislation that its
broad provisions "are liable to furnish boundless opportunity to hold up and blackmail
and make unnecessary trouble without any corresponding benefits to society."
To punish those who transport inmates of a house of prostitution on an innocent
vacation trip in no way related to the practice of their commercial vice is consistent
neither with the purpose nor with the language of the Act. Congress was attempting
primarily to eliminate the "white slave" business which uses interstate and foreign
commerce as a means of procuring and distributing its victims and "to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling thousands of women and girls against their will and
desire to enter and continue in a life of prostitution." Such clearly was not the situation
revealed by the facts of this case. 03
The Mortensen case, in other words, reveals a revolt against Caminetti.
The fear of blackmail, the knowledge that Congress intended to eliminate
white slavery, and the lack of compulsion for the pleasure trip made the
vacation and the trip back innocent. Yet Mortensen was more closely connected with the business of commercialized vice, since, after all, petitioners were running a house of prostitution, than were the Caminetti cases.
1o bid., at 376.
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But if the cross-country pleasure trip of the Mortensens was outside
the Act, what of a four-block trip within the District of Columbia, paid
for by the employer of a prostitute? The problem arose in the Beach
case.Y0 4 The defendant operated a dress shop. She employed a girl as her
assistant; the girl lived with her, and on the suggestion of the defendant
that the girl could earn more money by "selling herself," the girl agreed
to work for the defendant as a prostitute. The fatal trip was a trip in a
taxicab paid for by the defendant, who accompanied the girl to the Hotel
Hamilton four blocks away from the apartment for the purpose of prostitution. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District reversed the conviction.OS Stating that local laws for the District covered the matter so completely that "about the only place in which the act can be done without
running athwart the local law is in an anchored balloon," Chief Justice
Groner found that the congressional purpose both at the time of the passage of the Mann Act and since, as indicated by subsequent local laws,
was that the White Slavery Traffic Act was not to apply within the District except for conduct having an interstate aspect. The literal language
was against him, Chief Justice Groner admitted. But there was some legislative history as to the Mann Act itself to support him; there were sub-.
sequent enactments; there was Justice Murphy's "well-considered Supreme Court dictum" in the Mortensen case, and "furthermore, once we
apply locally the provisions of the Mann Act, we should also be required
to accept the results implicit in the doctrine of the Caminetti case. ' b' °6
The Supreme Court thought otherwise. In a majority per curiam opinion, it held that "Congress, in enacting the Mann Act, made it perfectly
clear by its Committee Reports ... that it was intended to apply to
transportation taking place wholly within the District. . . ." In answer to
the dissenting opinion which followed, it said, "No other question was considered or decided below or discussed in the briefs and arguments of counsel here, and we decide no other." While it is not clear that the argument
was so strictly limited, the main thrust of the defendant's position was
that purely local matters were not to be covered. In addition to pointing
to the legislative history, the defendant said there had been "a uniform,
established custom for more than a quarter of a century ... never to
United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193 (1945).
1os 144 F. 2d 533 (App. D.C., '944).
.o6 Chief Justice Groner quoted the following language from the dissent of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 432 (1943): "A statute like any other living
organism, derives significance and sustenance from its environment, from which it cannot be
severed without being mutilated. Especially is this true where the statute like the one before
us, is part of a legislative process having a history and a purpose. The meaning of such a
statute cannot be gained by confining inquiry within its four comers."
104

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

prosecute under the Mann White Slave Act for a transportation wholly
''
within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. Io7
The dissent of Justice Murphy was much more central. Surely the Act
applied to white-slave traffic solely within the District. The difficulty was
that there was no white slavery, and the prostitution was voluntary. The
prior construction of the Act had been erroneous, ignoring the "plain Congressional purpose" with the result of punishing "anyone transporting a
woman for immoral purposes quite apart from any connection with whiteslavery." The result would be blackmail and unjust punishment. "No
principle of stare decisis and no rule of statute or reason can justify such
107 United States v. Beach, Brief in Opposition to Certiorari is-17. "At the outset of the
enforcement of the Mann White Slave Act the Department of Justice took an official attitude
that only cases involving commercialism should be prosecuted. Despite the Diggs-Caminetti
cases decided by this Court on January 15, 1917, the Department of Justice in Circular No.
647, issued January 26, 1917, drew attention to the fact that the Department policy would not
be altered and instructed the United States Attorneys as follows: 'This decision does not seem
to admit of any change in the general policy that has been prosecuted in the past six years with
satisfactory results in the enforcement of this law. On July 28, r9r (Department File 14582565) Attorney General Wickersham said: "Such a case (concubinage) would fall technically
within the statute.., in the application of the law federal courts must be careful. . . to
prevent them being turned into ordinary courts of quarterly sessions to deal with... violations
of the police regulations of the community which should be dealt with by the local tribunals."
[Italics supplied.] From the beginning District Attorneys have been advised by the Department as follows: "As to specific cases the Department must rely upon the discretion of the
District Attorneys who have firsthand knowledge of the facts and an opportunity for personal interviews with the witnesses... and what reasons, if any, exist for thinking the
ends of justice will be better served by the prosecution under federal law than under the laws
of the state having jurisdiction." As a guide to the exercise of his discretion in non-commercial
cases, you are advised that cases involving a fraudulent over-reaching or involving previously chaste or very young women or girls (when state laws are inadequate) involving married
women (with young children) then living with their husbands, may properly receive consideration; that blackmail cases should, so far as possible, be avoided and that whenever the
woman herself, voluntarily and without any over-reaching, has consented to the criminal
arrangements, she, too, if the case shall seem to demand it, may be prosecuted as a conspirator.'
That administrative policy of the Department of Justice has been continued to date. There
has been a uniform, established custom for more than a quarter century indulged in on the
part of the United States Government never to prosecute under the Mann White Slave Act
for a transportation wholly within the boundaries of the District of Columbia. Not only has
there been a non-use of the Federal Power to prosecute locally in the District of Columbia
under the Mann White Slave Act but public policy has also favored such inaction. In the
District of Columbia the offense of fornication has a maximum statutory penalty of $roo or
six months, or both, and the offense of adultery is likewise a misdemeanor. It would seem
absurd, therefore, with the light punishments for those crimes to contend that Congress intended that a taxicab ride of 32 blocks, with the incidental feature of transportation wholly
within the District of Columbia, would transform those misdemeanors into a heinous and
loathsome felony having an extreme punishment."
But note the Government's petition for certiorari stated at pages 4, 5: "As the United States
Attorney showed in a supplemental memorandum in support of a motion for rehearing in the
court below, it has previously been assumed that the Act applies to transportation within the
District of Columbia. Although, as he pointed out, it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of prosecutions based upon that theory, he referred specifically to four such provisions in
the years 1936-1937."
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a result." The Court had added "another instance of tortured and grotesque application" to the "already unhappy history" of the statute.
It was possible to dispose of the Beach case because of the limited point
deemed raised and stressed without rethinking either Caminetti or its
broad doctrine that the statute included all acts commonly thought to be
sexually immoral. Cleveland v. United States"°8 permitted no such dodge.
The defendants were Mormons who believed in and practiced polygamy.
They had transported plural wives across state lines; prosecution under
the Mann Act followed. The convictions were affirmed.
The majority opinion of Justice Douglas in the Cleveland case proceeds
along the lines set by the prosecution in Caminetti. The problem was the
application of "any other immoral purposes." The phrase was not limited
to sexual relations for hire even though 'he Act was aimed primarily at
the white-slave business. Prostitution suggested sexual relations for hire;
not so debauchery. Therefore under the ejusdem generis rule, while thegeneral words could not be used to enlarge the class, they could not be
more narrowly confined than the class of which they are a part. Polygamous practices "have long been branded as immoral in the law.... They
have been outlawed in our society." They had been called by the Court
"contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the modern world." Religion would not protect
the defendants; Congress had provided the standard of immorality. While
the majority opinion does not explicitly say so, the test is the wide one of
Caminetti. The Court said it would not "stop to reexamine the Caminetti
case to determine whether the Act was properly applied to the facts there
presented. But we adhere to its holding, which has been in force for almost
thirty years, that the Act, while primarily aimed at the use of interstate
commerce for the purpose of commercialized sex, is not restricted to that
end." But the Court actually did more. It took Caminetti in its widest
sweep.
The dissent of Justice Murphy was to be expected. The age of the
Caminetti case did "not justify its continued existence. Stare decisis does
not require a court to perpetuate a wrong for which it was responsible."
Moreover, the Caminetti case could be factually distinguished. Polygamy
was after all a form of marriage. The form of marriage before the Court
was "basically a cultural institution rooted deeply in the religious beliefs
and social mores of those societies in which it appears." It was certainly
not in the same genus as " 'prostitution,' 'debauchery' and words of that
ilk." Presumably Justices Black and Jackson saw a similar distinction, for
log
329 U.S. 14 (1946).
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they also dissented on the ground that "affirmance requires extension of
the rule announced in the Caminetti case and that the correctness of that
rule is so dubious that it should at least be restricted to its particular
facts."
The problem of the legal process was explicitly discussed in a concurring
opinion by Justice Rutledge. He did not think it would be possible "rationally to reverse the convictions, at the same time adhering to Caminetti and later decisions perpetuating its ruling." He thought the Caminetti
case had been wrongly decided. At least it had "extended the Mann Act's
coverage beyond the congressional intent and purpose, as the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna convincingly demonstrated." But the
Caminetti case "has not been overruled and has the force of law until a
majority of this Court may concur in the view that this should be done
and take action to that effect. This not having been done, I acquiesce in
the Court's decision." He did not say why.
But justice Rutledge did indicate that the Court was free to overrule
Caminetti. This was not an instance where it was proper for the Court to
"shift to Congress the responsibility for perpetuating the Court's error."
Apparently this shift of responsibility would be equivalent to saying that
the silence of Congress was consent to the erroneous interpretation. But
the silence of Congress should not always be taken as approval. The failure of Congress to repudiate misconstruction might be due to the "sheer
pressure of other and more important business. At times, political considerations may work to forbid taking corrective action. And in such
cases, as well as others, there may be a strong and proper tendency to
trust to the courts to correct their own errors." He doubted whether "majorities could have been mustered in approval of the Caminetti case at any
time since it was rendered." It was true that two bills had been introduced to limit the effect of the Caminetti case and "neither was reported
out of committee." But "in such circumstances the failure of Congress to
amend the Act raises no presumption as to its intent."
The history of the Mann Act shows the ambiguity of legislative intent.
The ambiguity is partially resolved by a decisive interpretation given to
the Act in the Caminetti case. The words used by the Court in that case
are not mere dictum. They gave direction to the Act. The direction has
been followed. The restriction thus placed upon the freedom of the Court
to realign cases sets legislative interpretation apart from the development
of case law.
The dissenting judges have complained about the loss of freedom.
Twice during his discussion of the silence of Congress, Justice Rutledge
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suggested that the reader should look at Girouardv. United States.1° 9 The
reference was to another majority opinion written by Justice Douglas.
The problem there was the application of the Naturalization Act to an
alien who refused to bear arms. The Court had previously held, in opinions much criticized, that such persons were barred from citizenship. The
Court disagreed with the interpretation set forth by the prior cases. It
stated, "As an original proposition, we could not agree with that rule." It
referred to a subsequent Act for its bearing on the intent of Congress. The
method was one which had previously been used by Justice Frankfurter
in the Hutcheson case.11 0 Both the Girouardand the Hutcheson cases may
be thought to involve great principles. One deals with the right of labor to
organize; Girouard deals with a question basic to civil liberties. And in
both cases the Court reversed its prior interpretation of a statute. The
temptation to do so was strong. As Justice Douglas stated, "The history
of the 194o Act is at most equivocal." But he had already indicated that
it was a substantial reenactment of the provisions involved of the prior
Act which had been interpreted differently. The opinion continues: "The
silence of Congress and its inaction are as consistent with a desire to leave
the problem fluid as they are with an adoption by silence of the rule of
those cases." As to this the Chief Justice in his dissent replied, "For us to
make such an assumption is to discourage, if not to deny legislative responsibility."
The Chief Justice saw no constitutional question. "No question of the
constitutional power of Congress to withhold citizenship on these grounds
was involved. That power was not doubted." But perhaps the justification
for the majority opinion is its oblique reference td the Constitution. "The
struggle for religious liberty," wrote Justice Douglas, "has through the
centuries been an effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the
conscience of the individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded
in our Bill of Rights recognizes that in the domain of consicence there is a
moral power higher than the State. Throughout the ages men have suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the author109328 U.S. 61 (1946); cf. Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (i945). There are
related problems. The theory of statutory interpretation advanced here would restrict the
ability of the Court to develop the law outside of the statute through case law, if prior interpretations have set the direction so-that the statute covered the field. See President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38 (1926); cf. International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (i918). When a statute is interpreted to refer to whatever area
of power is granted by the Constitution, the statute changes as the Constitution changes. See
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (r944); cf. Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943), and Montana Horse Products Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
91 Mont. 194 (1932); see Lyon, Old Statutes and New Constitution, 44 Col. L. Rev. 599 (1944).
11oUnited States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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ity of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment
is the product of that struggle." To be sure, the opinion does not rest on
the Constitution. Rather its direction was, "We do not believe the Congress intended to reverse that policy when it came to draft the naturalization oath. Such an abrupt and radical departure from our traditions
should not be implied."
But the appeal to the Constitution is important. Ordinarily a principle
to be great enough to justify a reversal of legislative interpretation must
be a matter for the Constitution. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy," wrote Justice Brandeis, and "this is commonly true even when the
error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by
legislation."' I Even when such correction could be had, the Constitution
might justify a change in position by the Court. In Erie v. Tompkins,"'
Justice Brandeis held the Judiciary Act to have been incorrectly interpreted. The opinion rests in part on the research of a "competent scholar"
as to the intent of Congress -an extraordinary step. But Justice Brandeis
was careful to say that the erroneous doctrine would not be abandoned if
it were only a matter of statutory interpretation. It was the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued" which "compels us to do so."
It is not that the silence of Congress implies anything. It is a problem
of responsibility and effective action. To say that the matter must be one
which involves the Constitution before the Court may reverse the interpretation of legislation places the responsibility where it belongs. But it
still leaves open the path for judicial action if the matter is thought vital.
The doctrine of finality for prior decisions setting the course for the interpretation of a statute is not always followed. Moreover, the appeal to
the Constitution which the doctrine compels may seem to be spurious, if it
is viewed as a matter of constitutional construction, not because the construction of the Constitution is wrong, but because the appeal is made in
such a manner as to avoid any construction. Nevertheless, the doctrine remains as more than descriptive. More than any other doctrine in the field
of precedent, it has served to limit the freedom of the court. It marks an
essential difference between statutory interpretation on the one hand and
case law and constitutional interpretation on the other.
o
"'xBurnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 4 6 (193i); Helvering v. Hallock, 3og
U.S. io6 (i94o); Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 280 (i94o); United States v.
Line Material Corp., 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948); cf. United States v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 16
U.S.L. Week 4343 (1948).
I12304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L. J. 267 (1946); cf. opinion of Chief justice Stone in
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 579 (i944).
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The written Constitution in the United States has been much discussed
for the power which the Court says it has been given to invalidate legislative acts. In words reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's language in
Marbury v. Madison,- 3 Justice Roberts explained the process as one in
which the article of the Constitution is laid beside the statute which is
challenged. The court then decides whether the "latter squares with the
former." "All the court does, or can do," said Justice Roberts, "is to announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has,
if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. The court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy."" 4 But as can be seen, while
the court neither approves nor condemns, in its exercise of judgment it
does have to determine whether there is any connection between what has
been done and one of the great ideals embodied in the Constitution. The
problem of seeing connection is not so dissimilar from passing upon the
wisdom of legislation as some have thought. If the proposal is one much
talked about in the early years of the life of a justice, it may be easy for
him to see the connection even though the proposal appears unwise. It is
much more difficult if the proposal appears both new and foolish.
In addition to the power to hold legislative acts invalid, a written constitution confers another and perhaps as great a power. It is the power to
disregard prior cases. "The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself, and not what we have said about it," Justice
Frankfurter has written." s The problem of stare decisis where a constitution is involved is therefore an entirely different matter from that in case
law or legislation. This is often overlooked when the court is condemned
for its change of mind. A change of mind from time to time is inevitable
when there is a written constitution. There can be no authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. The Constitution in its general provisions
embodies the conflicting ideals of the community. Who is to say what
these ideals mean in any definite way? Certainly not the framers, for they
did their work when the words were put down. The words are ambiguous.
Nor can it be the Court, for the Court cannot bind itself in this manner;
an appeal can always be made back to the Constitution. Moreover, if it is
said that the intent of the framers ought to control, there is no mechanism
for any final determination of their intent. Added to the problem of ambiguity and the additional fact that the framers may have intended a
n3 i Cr. (U.S.) 137 (1803).

States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 62 (1936).
its
Graves v. New York, 3o6 U.S. 466, 491 (1939).
114United
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growing instrument, there is the influence of constitution worship. This
influence gives great freedom to a court. It can always abandon what has
been said in order to go back to the written document itself. It is a freedom greater than it would have had if no such document existed. The difference in the British practice is revealing. But this may say no more than
that a written constitution, which is frequently thought to give rigidity
to a system, must provide flexibility if judicial supremacy is to be permitted.
It may be suggested that the doctrine should be otherwise; that as with
legislation so with a constitution, the interpretation ought to remain fixed
in order to permit the people through legislative machinery, such as the
constitutional convention or the amending process, to make a change.
But the answer lies not only in the difficulties of obtaining an amendment,
nor the difficult position of a court which obdurately refuses to interpret
common words in a way ordinary citizens believe to be proper. The more
complete answer is that a written constitution must be enormously ambiguous in its general provisions. If there has been an incorrect interpretation of the words, an amendment would come close to repeating the same
words. What is desired is a different emphasis, not different language. This
is tantamount to saying that what is required is a different interpretation
rather than an amendment.
Thus constitutional interpretation cannot be as consistent as case-law
development or the application of statutes. The development proceeds in
shifts; occasionally there are abrupt changes in direction. Within a period
and a subject matter there will be some consistency. The training of judges
is reasoning by example in any event, and within certain areas cases will
be compared and developed. Consistency cannot be overlooked entirely.
The word of Justice Roberts is evidence of that. His change invote produced one of the most dramatic shifts in recent Supreme Court history;
yet he later was to complain that too many reversals tend "to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket,
good for this day and train only."",,6 There will be some consistency, but
it is not the consistency of case law or statute.
Differences are immediately apparent. Each major concept written into
the document embodies a number of conflicting ideals. The commerce
clause, for example, at different times represents the virtues of home rule
and the glory of the strength of a nation. The conflicting ideas are represented by satellite categories which interpret the written word. No one
x6 Smithv. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944); cf. London Street Tramways Co. v. London
County Council, [1895] A. C. 375, 380.
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satellite concept can control. The major words written in the document
are too ambiguous; the ideals are too conflicting, and no interpretation
can be decisive. The satellite words are handled with a recognition that
they involve the perennial problems of government; the relationship between problems of the person, the state, and property rights. In our own
system the fourth problem of the distribution of powers within a federal
system is added. Case-law concepts deal with some of the same problems
but less obviously. There is an affirmative recognition in a constitutional
case that the problem is the connection between what is sought to be done
and the ideals of the community. Connection and consequence must be
argued. The emphasis on consequence makes the hypothetical example
more important.
Perhaps it is easier for the court to see connection when the problem
does not appear controversial. Courts which will rebel against taking a
step during a controversy (which makes all kinds of hypothetical cases
seem important) may slide into the same position when a more minor matter is involved. The position will be the same if reasoning by example later
on can make it so. If the problem is to show the connection to the court,
then the Brandeis brief, which attempts to do that, is less significant than
the general prior talk and the social studies which have already had an
effect upon the community. To put it another way, the Brandeis brief
is important, but not so much for the case in which it is used as for some
later case when its analysis has been accepted by the community. The examples used in the successful brief of the Government in the FairLabor
Standards case (the Darby case) were similar and sometimes identical to
those used in the unsuccessful brief in the Child Labor case. It was the
community, not the briefs, which had changed.
The consequence of this is that a constitution cannot prevent change;
indeed by permitting an appeal to the constitution, the discretion of the
court is increased and change made possible. The possible result of this in
some fields may seem alarming. It is only a reminder, however, that "ulti7
mate protection is to be found in the people themselves."I"1
217 Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 614, 618 (1927).
The use of a written constitution to justify a change in position is illustrated by the United
States position before the United Nations Security Council with respect to the enforcement
of the partition of Palestine. The New York Times for February 25, 1948 quotes the United
States Delegate:
"The recommendation of the General Assembly makes three separate requests of the

Security Council.
"The first-(A)-is that the Council 'take the necessary measures as provided for in the
plan for its implementation....'
"We come now to the two following requests of the General Assembly as set forth in the
resolution of Nov. 29. These invoke the wide peace-keeping powers of the Security Council
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The development in the application of a constitutional provision may
be shown in terms of the power of the federal government to prohibit commerce. This was the constitutional problem raised by the Mann Act. In
handling this problem the satellite concept of illicit commodities developed. The concept itself is revealing, for as will be seen, an illicit commodity is only an instance of a case where the Court is able to see the connection between the regulation or prohibition and the ideals of the community. And because the Court has been able to see the connection for
some items, reasoning by example has then been able to extend the category. The analogy to deceased cattle and to lottery tickets in the debate
on the Mann Act was not intended to be humorous. Present-day minimum
wage and hour legislation owes its existence in some measure to deceased
cattle, drunkards, defrauders, prostitutes, auto thieves, kidnapers, and
convicts, and to those who sought to control them.
The Constitution does not say that Congress may "preserve the morals
of the community by making it unlawful to transport women across a
state line for immoral purposes. ' m s The language is simple and ambiguunder the Charter. Request B in the resolution asks the Security Council to consider whether
the situation in Palestine during the transitional period constitutes a threat to the peace.
"The third request of the General Assembly-(C)-asks that 'the Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with
Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this
resolution....'
"Requests B and C of the Assembly's resolution, mentioned above, raised constitutional
questions of the Security Council's powers under the Charter. What are the powers of the
Security Council?...
"Although the Security Council is empowered to use, and would normally attempt to use,
measures short of armed force to maintain the peace, it is authorized under the Charter to
use armed force if it considers other measures inadequate. A finding by the Security Council
that a danger to peace exists places all members of the United Nations, regardless of their
views, under obligation to assist the Council in maintaining peace.
"If the Security Council should decide that it is necessary to use armed force to maintain
international peace in connection with Palestine, the United States would be ready to consult under the Charter with a view to such action as may be necessary to maintain international peace. Such consultation would be required in view of the fact that agreement has
not yet been reached making armed force available to the Security Council under the terms
of Article 43 of the Charter.
"The Security Council is authorized to take forceful measures with respect to Palestine to
remove a threat to international peace. The Charter of the United Nations does not empower
the Security Council to enforce a political settlement, whether it is pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly or of the Council itself.
"What this means is this: The Council under the Charter can take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council by these same powers can take action to
prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. But this action
must be directed solely to the maintenance of the international peace. The Council's action,
in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition."
"X8 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), Brief for Govemment Officers 127.
See generally Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, x933-i946, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 645, 883 (1946); Hamilton and Adair, The Power To Govern (1937); Sharp, Move-
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ous: "The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
In the absence of some mechanism for achieving an authoritative determination, neither the literal meaning nor the intention of the framers can
be decisive. Even if the words were to be applied in accordance with the
meaning they had when written, they could be given a broad or narrow
application. In later years" among" in its context has carried the connotation of "between," but throughout the period it has also meant "intermingled with"":9-a term which might preserve or obliterate the power of
the states. Commerce might have been used to "refer to the entire moneyed economy-to the processes by which men obtain money, whether by
the production or manufacture of goods for sale, or by the exchange of
goods produced by others."

0

It may have been used to include "the mar-

keting of the products after the processing has been completed" and not
"manufacturing mining or agriculture as such."1'' 2 Perhaps it was broad
enough to include the movement of goods, as a part of traffic, even though
the goods were not what would be termed commercial today.
To some extent the understanding of the framers of the Constitution
must have been to have a national government able to operate in "all
cases where the States are incompetent" or "in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." This was the Sixth Virginia Resolution, and it was adopted by the
Convention. But the delegation of power to the federal government in the
commerce clause, except for the word "among," which may make all the
difference, bears a close resemblance to the defeated New Jersey Plan
which was said to give to the national government "additional powers in a
few cases only."" 2 Indeed it has been urged that the commerce clause
was "a negative and preventive provision" intended to bring about "freedom of commercial intercourse" by removing barriers placed by the states
but without any grant of power to Congress itself "to prohibit commerce
in legitimate articles."'"1 The separate provision prohibiting the states
ment in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 361, 593, 795 (x933).
"X9Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335,
1347 (i934).

U.S. 1oo (x94'), Brief for United States 51-52.

120

United States v. Darby,

121

Stern, op. cit. supra note ri9, at x346.

312

1338.
Madison, Letter to Cabell, Feb. 13, 1829,3 Farrand 478, quoted in Brief for Government
Officers in Carter Coal case 177 (1925).
z22"bid., at
123
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from levying "any imposts or duties on imports or exports" and the failure
to deny to Congress the right to prohibit from commerce the products of
slave labor have been urged, in the one case for and in the latter instance
against, a broad interpretation of the commerce clause124 To the necessary
ambiguity of word and intention must be added the knowledge that some
of the framers at least were aware that "there ought to be a capacity to
provide for future contingencies. '' 5 Perhaps they expected the words to
change their meanings as exigencies arose. Perhaps they realized that am-

biguity was

best2

6

A decisive interpretation was required to resolve the ambiguity. A
broad and a compelling opinion was given by Chief Justice Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden. The case concerned the right of New York to grant a
monopoly of the right to use steam navigation within its territorial waters,
and thus raised sharply the problem of whether commerce included navigation and, in the context of this case, conferred exclusive power on the
federal government. In stating that it did, Marshall said: "The subject to
be regulated is commerce .... The counsel for the appellee would limit it
to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and
do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all of its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carry7
ing on that intercourse.'
With navigation included within the field of commercial intercourse,
the problem was what was reserved for the states. The dividing line was
given in these terms: "The genius and character of the whole government
seems to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, but not to those which are completely within a particular
State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary
to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of
124Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
3 Minn. L. Rev. 452, 459 (i919); Stern, op. cit. supra note 19, at 1345.
12sThe Federalist No. 34, at 217 (Tudor ed., i937).
X26"Neither the Philadelphia Convention nor the discussions preceding ratification of its
labors generated currents of important thoughts concerning the process of adjusting Congressional and state authorities. The records disclose no constructive criticisms by the states of
the commerce clause as proposed to them.. . . The influential early commentators on the
Constitution-the Federalist and Tucker's Blackstone-shed most flickering and ambiguous
light on the reach of the commerce clause.... And so, when first confronted with the commerce clause, the Supreme Court had to evolve doctrines without substantial guidance or restriction by previous discussion and analysis." Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause x2 (1937).
127
9 Wheat. (U.S.) i, iss (824).
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the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may
be considered as reserved for the State itself." The states had the power to
enact inspection and health laws, which came to be classified generally as
police measures; the national government had the power to control that
commercial intercourse which concerned more states than one.
But even the broad interpretation by Marshall left much ambiguity.
Apparently it might be possible for a state to assert a police regulation
over a matter which from a different point of view involved commerce
among the states. And the Chief Justice did not feel compelled to answer
what would be the result if New York, for example, were to have granted
a monopoly within its territorial waters, in the absence of any federal regulation whatsoever over the subject. Yet the direction in favor of national
power was clear. But a constitution cannot be so controlled, even though
the rule stated and the example were persuasive. Already satellite concepts were at work. The federal government could regulate if the item
were included within commercial intercourse, the exchange of commodities
or navigation among the states. The individual state had power to regulate if the item could be classified as a matter for inspection or health or a
police regulation. Reasoning by example would work within these categories and would create new ones.
These problems were important in the eighty-nine-year span between
Gibbons v. Ogden and the consideration of the Mann Act. They were i)
what items and articles were to be considered as a part of the traffic of
commercial intercourse; 2) what activities were likely to fall within that
area which concerns more states than one and, therefore, within the orbit
of the federal government; and 3) to what extent the power to regulate
includes the power to exclude or prohibit. The facts of Gibbons v. Ogden
gave only partial answers. To be sure, navigation was included within
commerce. Universal understanding in America put it there, Marshall
said. But there was no answer from the facts as to whether or not the federal government might prohibit navigation. What of the items or articles
which might be considered as a part of the traffic? Did they include persons? This would be important later on in connection with the Mann Act.
It had been urged that one who carried passengers could not insist that
the activity was within the commerce which Congress alone might
regulate. But Marshall said "no clear distinction is perceived between
the power to regulate vessels in transporting men for hire and property
for hire." The facts of the case, however, dealt with the regulation of vessels carrying persons as items of the traffic; persons as traffic were involved
only in a limited sense.
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Thirteen years later, when the Court in The Mayor v. Mille28 passed
upon a regulation of New York requiring the masters of vessels arriving
from foreign ports to give detailed reports on the passengers, a change in
the meaning of the categories was already apparent. The act, the Court
said, was not "a regulation of commerce but of police." Beyond that,
while goods were the subject of commerce, the persons were not. 29 "They
are not the subject of commerce, and not being imported goods, cannot
fall within a train of reasoning founded upon the construction of a power
given to Congress to regulate commerce." Perhaps more important, justice Barbour, who in this at least seemed to be speaking for a majority of
the Court, 30 said, "We think it is as competent and as necessary for a
state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of
paupers, vagabonds and possibly convicts, as it is to guard against the
physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles
imported from a ship, the crew of which may be laboring under an infectious disease." The category of moral pestilence is thus announced as a
way of construing the Constitution along with commercial intercourse,
navigation, and police regulations.
But when New York and Massachusetts attempted to go further and
to collect fees rather than reports for incoming passengers, the Court
showed the majority had not meant that persons might not be articles of
commerce. The acts were unconstitutional; 3' the transportation of passengers was classified as a branch of commerce. The acts could not be justified solely as "internal police regulations." But note the language of Mr.
justice Wayne:
But I have said the States have the right to turn off paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, and the States where slaves are have a constitutional right to exclude
all such as are, from a common ancestry and country, of the same class of men. And
when Congress shall legislate, if it be disrespectful for one who is a member of the
judiciary to suppose so absurd a thing of another department of the government,to make paupers, vagabonds, suspected persons, and fugitives from justice subjects of
admission into the United States, I do not doubt it will be found and declared, should
it ever become a matter for judicial decision, that such persons are not within the regulating power which the United States have over commerce. Paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives never have been subject of rightful national intercourse, or of commercial
regulation, except in the transportation of them to distant colonies to get rid of them,
or for punishment as convicts. They have no rights of national intercourse; no one has
128 11
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a right to transport them, without authority of law, from where they are to any other

place, and their only rights where they may be2 are such as the law gives to all men who
have not altogether forfeited its protection.13
Moral pestilence, in other words, was a most important category. It
might be double-edged. It might permit the states to regulate or exclude
items of traffic which otherwise could be controlled only by the federal
government. Perhaps this was only an extension of the idea of a police
regulation. It seemed so obvious to Justice Wayne that the safety of the
local community meant paupers, vagabonds, and suspected persons could
be kept out, that it was a matter of disrespect to the federal legislature to
think it would ever try to let them in. But the other edge of the idea might
be that the federal government, if indeed it could not let such supposed
carriers of moral pestilence in, could also lend its aid in keeping them out.
If the United States were to do this, who could complain? Surely not the
persons regulated or the persons who sought to bring them in, for the persons so tainted "have no rights of national intercourse; no one has a right
to transport them, without authority of law ...." Moral pestilence then
might be a most important category indeed. It could operate to confer
governmental authority both on the states and on the federal government.
An item might appear to be excluded from the commerce power for one
reason or another, and yet be restored to it if it were a matter of moral
pestilence.
The idea of moral pestilence, which soon would go by other names as
well, would become increasingly important if the items covered by the
commerce clause were to be thought of normally as articles valuable for
barter and sale. Commercial intercourse might well seem to carry that
connotation. Something of this reasoning in fact was behind the recurring
idea, which was soon to vanish, that persons were not the subject of commerce. In a sense persons were like insurance contracts, which the Court
in 1868 proceeded to say "are not subjects of trade and barter offered in
the market as something having an existence and value independent of the
parties to them. They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded
from one state to another, and then put up for sale."' . 33 A court reluctant
to confer federal power could narrow the category of articles of commerce.
Trade marks might be the symbols by which men engage in trade and
manufacture, but that did not mean they were clearly within the commerce power.
Ibid., at 425.
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U.S.) i68, I83 (i868); see also Henderson v. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259, 275 (1875).
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"Every species of property," the Court pointed out,' 34 "which is the
subject of commerce, or which is used or even essential in commerce is
not brought by this clause within the control of Congress. The barrels and
casks, the bottles and boxes in which alone certain articles of commerce
are kept for safety and by which their contents are transferred from the
seller to the buyer, do not thereby become the subjects of congressional
legislation more than other property." The language reflected a shift away
from the broad powers which might have been conferred by Gibbons v.
Ogden. In the face of such a shift perhaps the category of moral pestilence
might be used to restore the power to govern. Perhaps it could be joined
with a concept carried by other cases, namely, that of "business affected
with a public interest," and some larger-category eventually formed as a
vehicle for interpreting both commerce and due process. The category
then could have in it not only paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives, but grain
and other necessities.
The satellite concepts so far were principally commercial intercourse,
the exchange of commodities and navigation or transportation on one side,
and inspection, health, and police regulations on the other. The category of
moral pestilence did not yet include many items. In a shift away from federal authority, greater emphasis had been placed on the necessity that the
commodities regulated be themselves the articles of value which were
bought and sold. The case of Kidd v. Pearson 35 added another popular
category calculated to interpret the commerce clause in such a way as to
cut down the power of the federal government. Iowa had proceeded to
regulate the manufacturing of intoxicating liquor, and it did so without
regard to the intention of the manufacturer to export the liquor when
made. The article regulated was one to which moral pestilence has sometimes been thought attached. The rule could have been put merely in
terms of a police regulation. But the language of the case went beyond.
Justice Lamar put it this way: "No distinction is more popular to the
common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature than that between manufacture and commerce." Undoubtedly Justice Lamar had as much right to rely on a distinction popular to the common mind as Chief Justice Marshall had to rely on the universal understanding in America in Gibbons v. Ogden.
The language of Kidd v. Pearsonwas used to popularize a new dividing
category. Manufacture, as with the regulation of grain, was a "thing of
domestic concern." Commerce among the states was now to be referred to
as "interstate," including as examples navigation or transporation. Soon
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it would be viewed conceptually as a "flow" across state lines. It had already come to include thousands of persons crossing on a bridge connecting two states., 6 The phrase "interstate commerce" itself incorporated
the distinction between manufacture and commerce. 37 Interstate commerce involved articles "bought, sold or exchanged for the purpose of...
transit."' 38 Interstate commerce did not include, for example, the activities of businessmen in controlling the refining of sugar in the United
States because "commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of
it.'

'

39

The interference with interstate commerce in such a case was at

least not direct. Manufacture as against commerce could be a way of
talking about indirect as against direct. Thus two new classifying words
were added.
When an attempt was made to apply the federal antitrust laws to the
local Kansas City Live Stock Exchange, the Court responded: "But in
all the cases which have come to this Court there is not one which has denied the distinction between a regulation which directly affects and embarrasses interstate trade or commerce, and one which is nothing more
than a charge for a local facility provided for the transaction of such commerce.' 4 Yet the rule of direct or indirect left room to argue that what
might have been local and indirect was transferred by intention and design into a plan to affect directly "the subsequent contract to sell and deliver."' 4' Intention and design which made for directness was the way the
Court could explain that it saw the relationship. But the rule of indirect
was strikingly different from that announced by Marshall, who had reserved for the states in Gibbons v. Ogden only "completely internal commerce" and those actions which "do not affect other states and with which
it is not necessary to interfere ......
The satellite concepts developed for the interpretation of the commerce
clause were numerous. To some extent they duplicated each other, as for
example the rule of manufacturing and the rule of indirect, which for a
time seemed to mean the same thing. But all in all the categories were a
way of comparing cases from different points of view. The problem of
what federal regulation was to be permitted did involve the relationships
in a nation between the person, the state, and property, and, in a para136Covington

and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 218 (1894).

13 See Stern, op. cit. supra note i9, at x348.
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mount way for the commerce clause, the distribution of powers between
the national and the local government. The categories reflected these concerns, but they did so by offering comparison of cases on the bases of what
types of property were involved; where did the action take place; what
was the act-for example, was it transportation?-and what was the motive or intention of the actor.
Among the array of concepts there was the category of moral pestilence. It might not always divide state from federal power. Perhaps it
would confer power on both. Justice Harlan had faintly suggested the approach in his dissent in the Knight case. 42 He spoke the language of effect
on the buying and selling of articles which go into interstate commerce as
opposed to manufacture. But he did more. This was no attempt, he said,
"to strike at the manufacture simply of articles that are legitimate or
recognized subjects of commerce." The point was somewhat more explicit
in Reid v. Colorado.143 The defendant had shipped cattle into Colorado
without having them first inspected as required by the law of that state.
The defense was that the shipment was a matter of interstate commerce
and under the Constitution not to be regulated by the state. The answer
was given by Justice Harlan not solely on the basis that Congress had not
"covered the whole subject of transportation of live stock." "The defendant," Justice Harlan wrote, "is not given by that instrument the right to
introduce into a State, against its will, live stock affected by a contagious,
infectious or communicable disease [even though the particular live stock
may not have been so affected], and whose presence in the State will or
may be injurious to its domestic animals." The position was in the tradition of Justice Wayne's dictum dealing with paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives. But it was now to become the basis for federal action.
The Federal Lottery Act 44 attempted to prohibit the carrying of any
lottery ticket from one state to another. Perhaps its constitutionality under the commerce clause could rest on the concept of transportation since
the tickets were carried interstate. Nevertheless, the regulation was over
commercial articles, and was not a lottery ticket like an insurance policy
-contingent and not in itself an item of barter and sale? If a lottery ticket
were not a commercial article, and the point was made by Chief Justice
Fuller in his dissent, 45- how was. it possible "to transform a non-commercial article into a commercial one simply because it is transported, as, for
example, an invitation to dine or take a drive"? "The power to prohibit
the transportation of diseased aninals and infected goods over railroads"
'42 r56 U.S. x, at 34 (1895).
144 28 Stat. 963 (x895).
143
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was different, "for they would be in themselves injurious to the transaction of interstate commerce, and, moreover, are essentially commerical
in their nature," but "nobody," according to the Chief Justice, "would
pretend that persons could be kept off trains because they were going from
one State to another to engage in the lottery business." The commerce
clause could not be enlarged to take care of lotteries. "In countries whose
fundamental law is flexible, it may be that the homely maxim, 'to ease the
shoe where it pinches,' may be applied, but under the Constitution of the
United States it cannot be availed of to justify action by Congress or by
the courts."
The case was difficult; it had to be argued three times. Not only did the
statute regulate traffic, in an article arguably non-commercial, but the
regulation was to prohibit.146 The majority opinion by Justice Harlan
spoke of "the widespread pestilence of lotteries." Lotteries once favored
had "grown into disrepute" and "become offensive to the entire people of
the Nation." The tickets were subjects of traffic and therefore of commerce. And if there were doubts as to the power to prohibit, "what clause
can be cited which in any degree, countenances the suggestion that one
may, of right, carry or cause to be carried from one State to another that
which will harm the public morals?" The act was constitutional even
though some might argue this would mean "Congress may arbitrarily exclude from commerce among the states any article, commodity or thing,
of whatever kind or nature, or however useful or valuable, which it may
choose... ." There would be time enough "to consider the constitutionality of such legislation when we must do so.... ." Lottery tickets could
have been regarded as symbols of local activity similar to manufacturing
and particularly suited for state regulation. But "we should hesitate
long," wrote Justice Harlan, "before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate commerce cannot be met
and crushed by the only power competent to that end." The rule of evil of
appalling character as a basis for national action was not as broad as that
suggested in Gibbons v. Ogden; even so it was suggested that the rule would
have to be narrowly confined to the regulation of things "useless or inherently harmful."'' 47
These were the years immediately before the passage and constitutional
test of the White Slave Traffic Act. No one concept could preempt the interpretation of the commerce clause. The language was that of direct or
z4
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indirect; commerce was transportation and becoming a "current"; the
nature of the article regulated was important. Any argument couched in
one concept could be answered in another. Nor could one interpret the
commerce clause by itself; the Fifth Amendment could be urged, and now
the Tenth. How much persuasion the concepts exercised then is hard to
tell. They were a result as well as a cause-indicating whether the Court
saw or failed to see importance and relationship. But the concepts would
have persuasive influence and the cases decided with them would be of
great importance for reasoning by example. For this reason the Lottery
cases were important. A pestilence seen there had suggested a rule concerning public morals.1
' 4 Other things could be compared to lotteries.
Harlan, himself, was back on the rule of direct or indirect the following
year in applying the Sherman Act to common-stock ownership through a
holding company of two somewhat competitive railroads."49 He was answered by White in a dissent raising the flag of the Tenth Amendment, although White the same year saw no such difficulty with the imposition of a
federal tax which might "destroy the business of manufacturing oleomargarine." Perhaps the obvious difference was that oleomargarine tended to
"deceive the public." The dissent was ambiguously concurred in by
Holmes, who then on his own accord admitted that Congress might regulate an instrument of commerce whose effect was only indirect, but this
was to be reserved for "heroic measures." Strangely enough for Holmes,
the intent of Congress seemed to have a bearing on the interpretation of
commerce, for if the intent was, through the anti-monopoly law, to "disintegrate society so far as it could into individual atoms," then "calling
such a law a regulation of commerce was a mere pretense." It would be
"an attempt to reconstruct society," and "Congress was not entrusted by
the Constitution with the power to make it. . . ." Nevertheless, it was
Holmes who weakened the rule of direct by adding words to it. He applied
the Sherman Act to a combination of packers.15° Commerce among the
states was "not a technical legal conception but a practical one, drawn
from the course of business." The movement of cattle affected was a "recurring course" or a "current" and therefore commerce. The effect on
commerce was direct; it was not "secondary, remote or merely probable."
The Court looked at social reforms reluctantly. It took pains to state
that the Tenth Amendment prevented the national government "under
148 "It
must now also be regarded as firmly established that the power over commerce,
while primarily intended to be exercised in behalf of economic interests, may be used for the
protection of safety, order and morals." Freund, Police Power 64 (1904).
'49Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
ISOSwift & Co. v. United States, i96 U.S. 375 (19o5).
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the pressure of a supposed general welfare" from attempting to exercise
powers not granted.'15 It held unconstitutional the First Employers' Liability Act because it was applicable to shop employees. Even Holmes

2
seemed to agree with this narrow interpretation of the commerce clause.'1

The government, itself, in its amicus brief had argued, and thus on the
constitutional point really conceded, that "the act would no more apply
to a purely local line of the company than to any other business,-the
mining of coal, for instance. . .

."

Harlan, who had seen appalling evil in

lotteries, and therefore the existence of national power, saw no such connection between "interstate commerce" and the right to "membership in
a labor organization as to authorize Congress to make it a crime against
the United States for an agent of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of such membership.'53 The attempt of Congress to force
the separation of coal mines from ownership by those railroads who transported the coal had to be cut down. s4 The railroad could comply by selling
the coal they had mined; then ownership of the mine and later transportation would be permitted. Otherwise, serious constitutional objections
would be present, among them the argument that the regulation prohibited. There was some acquiescence by the Court in federal regulations.
Minimum-hour legislation for railroad employees "connected with the
movement of trains in interstate transportation"'5 5 and safety regulations
applicable to railroad cars which moved not only in inter- but intra-state
commerce as well were upheld, but this was because safety and movement
s6
seemed apparent.'
It was so much easier when it came to something like the Pure Food and
Drugs Act. The act was severe. It prohibited the introduction into any
state or territory, from any other state or territory, of any article of food
or drugs which is adulterated. It was applied to cans of eggs, adulterated
because they contained a quantity of boric acid.'5 The Court took the
act in its stride. "We are dealing," said justice McKenna, "it must be remembered, with illicit articles-articles which the law seeks to keep out of
commerce .... There is here no conflict of national and state jurisdictions
'5Z Kansas
Is2The

v. Colorado, 2o6 U.S. 46 (1907).
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (i9o8).
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over property legally articles of trade. The question here is whether articles which are outlaws of commerce may be seized wherever found, and it
certainly will not be contended that they are outside of the jurisdiction
of the national government when they are within the borders of a State."
The power to outlaw articles of commerce was a restatement of moral
pestil6nceY18
It was against this background that the Court considered the constitutionality of the Mann Act in Hoke and Economides v. United States.159 The
Act sought to prohibit the transportation of any woman or girl in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any
other immoral purpose. The defendant argued that "the power to regulate commerce does not confer upon Congress the power to regulate the
morality or any other immorality... of citizens individually." It was
pointed out that immorality was a "phrase broad enough to reach drinking, gambling, exposure of person, fighting, lying, profanity-in fact any
fraility which the flesh is heir to." And even though "prostitutes, both
male and female" are "generally and justly deemed immoral," they "are
citizens of their respective states, with all the privileges and immunities
possessed by any other citizens and one of their privileges is to travel interstate, regardless of moral or immoral intent at the end of the trip."
Moreover, persons were not the subject of commerce, and it was up to
the states, in accordance with their reserved powers, to deal with such
local matters as morals and prostitution.
No trace of difficulty is to be found in Justice McKenna. In the first
place the language of the Constitution was clear. "Congress is given power
'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.'
The power is direct: there is no word of limitation in it, and its broad and
universal scope has been so often declared as to make repetition unnecessary. And besides, it has had so much illustration by way of cases that it
would seem as if there could be no instance of its exercise that does not
find an admitted example in some one of them." Unfortunately, "experience, however, is the other way, and in almost every instance of the exercise! of the power differences are asserted from previous exercises of it and
made a ground of attack. The present case is an example."
The regulation was like that exercised in the Lottery cases, and over
debased and adulterated articles. "Let an article be debased by adulteration, let it be misrepresented by false branding, and Congress may exercise its prohibitive power. It may be that Congress could not prohibit in
1s8 See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
159227
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all of its conditions its sale within a State. But Congress may prohibit its
transportation between the States and by that means defeat the motive
and evils of its manufacture." Congress had power to prohibit "outlaws of
commerce." "But it is asserted that 'it is the right and privilege of a person
to move between States' and that such being the right, another cannot be
made guilty of the crime of inducing or assisting in the exercise of it and
'that the motive or intention of the passengers, either before beginning the
journey, or during or after completing it, is not a matter of interstate
commerce.' The contentions confound things important to be distinguished. It urges a right exercised in morality to sustain a right to be exercised in immorality.... It is misleading to say that men and women
have rights. Their rights cannot fortify or sanction their wrongs; and if
they employ interstate transportation as a facility of their wrongs, it may
be forbidden to them." The analogy of these cases was not affected, it was
said, because women are not articles of merchandise. "The substance of
the congressional power is the same." It was too bad Chief Justice Fuller
was not around to see that "persons could be kept off trains because they
were going from one State to another to engage" in something at least like
the lottery business.
It was one thing to justify an act which sought to prevent the use of
women as unwilling articles of trade; it was perhaps quite different to
justify under the commerce power a prohibition against interstate movement by seekers after illicit pleasure. It would be at least more outside a
word intended to "refer to the entire moneyed economy." The argument
advanced by the government in the Hoke case, to be sure, was broad
enough to cover both, placed as it was on grounds of public morals as distinguished from the economic affairs of the people. The dissent by Justice
Lamar in the Holte case,160 where the woman was cooperative, takes a
somewhat different turn, however. He suggested, and Justice Day concurred, that if she were "voluntarily traveling on her own account," she
would then "cease to be an object of transportation." The argument was
a throwback to the old view that persons were not the subject of traffic.
One might recall the language of Justice Barbour and Justice Wayne and
suggest that the more willing and the more immoral, the more subject to
prohibition the traffic would be. At all events the arguments were again
advanced in Camineltix61 the Court responded by stating that "the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses.., is no longer open to question." At least
x6o236
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where a moral pestilence was involved, commerce was not a matter solely
of economics.
From the prohibition of white slavery, which, of course, did not mean
white slavery, it was an easy step to the prohibition of foreign imports of
prize-fight pictures.16 2 It was a small step to the closing of interstate commerce to false and fraudulently branded articles1 63 Yet here the article
might be harmless in itself. How could Congress close the channels of
commerce to innocent merchandise? The argument had been advanced
in the Tobacco case 64 without even winning a retort from the Court.
Possibly the answer there was along the lines suggested by Harlan in the
Knight case. Even innocent articles might be considered infected with the
odium of monopoly and restraint. And so here Justice Hughes now explained:
Referring to the nature of the statements which are within the purvied of the
amendment [the misbranding clause of the Food and Drugs Act], it is said that a distinction should be taken between articles that are illicit, immoral or harmful and those
which are legitimate.... But the question remains as to what may be regarded as
"illicit" and we find no ground for saying that Congress may not condemn the interstate transportation of swindling preparations, designed to cheat credulous sufferers
and make such preparations, accompanied by false and fraudulent statements, illicit
with respect to interstate commerce, as well as, for example, lottery tickets.... The
false and fraudulent statement, which the amendment describes, accompanies the
article in the package and thus gives to the article its character in interstate commerce.16s

Thus by the use of adjectives, subjects could be made bad. Was there no
limit to the articles which could be thus condemned, and as to which, in
fact, all other distinctions dropped away, as, for example, the distinction
between manufacture and commerce? Hughes suggested an answer:
Finally the statute is attacked upon the ground that it enters the domain of speculation.... We think that this objection proceeds upon a misconstruction of the
provision. Congress deliberately excluded the field where there are honest differences
of opinion between schools and practitioners.... It was, plainly, to leave no doubt upon this point that the words "false and fraudulent" were used.... Congress recognized that there was a wide field in which assertions as to curative effect are in no
sense honest expressions of opinion and constitute absolute falsehoods and in the
nature of the case can be deemed to have been made only with fraudulent purpose.' 66
Perhaps this was the very center of the problem of interpretation. It
questioned the role of the expert. It might deny authority where there was

.62Weber

v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1x9S).

63Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 51o (1916).
164United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. io6
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an honest difference of opinion and wait for the time when there was that
universal understanding, to which Marshall referred, or the assumed
unanimous reaction which Harlan described when lotteries were condemned as "offensive to the entire nation."
In dealing with a case involving intoxicating liquor, White explicitly
made the category of articles transported controlling. Since the act of
Congress in this case was in aid of state regulation, the argument had been
advanced that to permit "state prohibitions to attach to the movement of
intoxicant lays the basis for subjecting interstate commerce in all articles
to state control, and therefore destroys the Constitution." The want of
force in the argument, White said, "becomes patent by considering the
principle which, after all dominates and controls the question here presented; that is, the subject regulated and the extreme power to which that
subject may be subjected. In other words the exceptionar nature of the
subject here regulated is the basis upon which the exceptional power exerted must rest .... )

In Wilson v. New, 6 ' where White permitted federal regulation of hours
and wages of railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce against
the background of a threatened strike which would have caused "the entire interruption" of that commerce, he gave some examples. He spoke of
the difference in the power of regulation "which may be exerted as to
liquor and that which may be exerted as to flour, dry-goods and other
commodities." The difference was shown "by the settled doctrine sustaining the right by regulation absolutely to prohibit lottery tickets and by
the obvious consideration that such rights to prohibit could not be applied to pig iron, steel rails, or most of the vast body of commodities." But
perhaps the categories were not unchangeably fixed, for White took account of the threatened strike, not as bearing on the type of regulation
permitted but on the power itself. It was a view in some contrast to the
dissenting opinion of Justice Pitney, who in words reminiscent of Chief
Justice Fuller, explained, "The suggestion that it was passed to prevent a
threatened strike, and in this sense to remove an obstruction from the
path of commerce, while true in fact is immaterial in law."
The Child Labor Act in 1917 provided a severe test for the meaning of
the category of illicit articles.'68 The act was to operate under the commerce clause, by keeping out of interstate commerce commodities made
in establishments in which "children under the age of fourteen years have
167243 U.S. 332 (1917); see Powell, The Supreme Court and the Adamson Law, 65 U. of
Pa.L. Rev. 607 (1917).
168Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (x9x8).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

been employed or permitted to work, or children between the age of fourteen years and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work
more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week.
.. " Certainly the interpretation of the commerce clause was not then
preempted by a category of illicit commodities. The clause had been applied to regulate unfair competition or monopolies. It had come to be identified more and more with transportation and as such it permitted the
federal power to regulate the use of safety devices and rates in intrastate
commerce where the effect was interstate. Yet the most promising justification for the act was that child labor was child slavery and like white
slavery, and that the products of child labor were like lottery tickets,
intoxicating liquor, adulterated articles, and goods misrepresented.
The government made the argument.' 6 9 Child labor was "in and of itself immoral iicharacter." Child labor was "child slavery."' 7 0 Its effects
were to be found in dwarfed bodies and minds.' 7 ' Steam and electricity
had made it so that a cause operating in one state is felt in another.172 It
was unfair competition, and state legislation was impossible unless the
states advanced together. 7 3 A change in public opinion regarding child
labor had occurred "like that in relation to lottery tickets.' 7 4 Whether
the articles produced by child labor were good or bad would have to be
judged by their effect. 75 Misbranded food might be wholesome. While the
manufacture in which child labor was used might seem local, "nothing is
more essentially a local matter than prostitution.' ' 76 The regulation of
Congress was to protect citizens in receiving states and to protect the
77
health of persons in competing states.
The complainant, who had filed a bill on behalf of himself and his two
minor sons to enjoin the enforcement of the act, argued that it was sometimes good for a young man to work. For example, his failure to work
might result in starvation for his mother and sisters.' 7' The power of Congress to restrict or prohibit could only be used where there was a "real
79
evil and injury involved in and attendant upon the commerce itself."'
The lottery, pure food and drug, and white slave cases involved this utilization of commerce itself. But "the product of a factory is not unsanitary
69Brief for the United States 1o, 42.
170 Ibid., at 14.
"7X Ibid.
172Ibid., at z6, i9 .A witness before the House Committee on Labor was quoted as follows:
"Session after session at our legislature we have been met by the cry from the manufacturers,
'State legislation is unfair. You ask us to compete with States of different standards. This interstate competition will ruin our business. If we must advance, let us advance together.'"
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or adulterated or unwholesome because it has been touched during the
process of manufacture, by a child's hand."''8 "It is not once suggested
that the man who consumes the product of child labor is guilty of an immoral act, as, of course, he is not. Immorality being thus eliminated, and
unwholesomeness having already been eliminated, it occurs to us this
statement of a national interest is fanciful and far fetched.'' xif The argument stressed the consequence of permitting the regulation. "It is abhorrent to many people that manufacturing processes should be carried on by
underpaid hands." If this type of regulation were permitted, then "Congress- may prescribe a minimum wage scale and forbid the product of a
82
factory in interstate commerce unless such minimum rates are paid.'
Indeed, many persons objected to the non-hiring of Negroes. Was Congress
then to be permitted to ban the products of factories which refused to hire
Negroes?
In a five-to-four decision, the Court, speaking through Justice Day,
held the act unconstitutional. The matter sought to be regulated, the production of articles, was a matter of local regulation, saved for the states
by the Tenth Amendment. Commerce was intercourse and traffic. It included the transportation of persons and property, but it did not include
such items as coal mining and manufacture. There was no authority to
prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities. The lottery tickets,
adulterated articles, and women to be used for immoral purposes were different. As to them "the authority to prohibit" was "but the exertion of
the power to regulate." In each one of those cases "the use of interstate
transportation was necessary for the accomplishment of harmful results.
In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was to
regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the
facilities of interstate commerce to affect the evil intended." Here there
apparently was no such use of commerce. The goods "shipped are of
themselves harmless."
Justice Holmes did not agree. The lottery case showed that commerce
might be prohibited. And this might be done even though the indirect effect was to regulate a local matter, as with the Mann Act, the Pure Food
and Drug Act, and the tax on oleomargarine. "The notion that prohibition is any less prohibition when applied to things now thought evil I do
not understand. But if there is any matter upon which civilized countries
have agreed-far more unanimously than they have with regard to intoxicants and some other matters over which this country is now emotionally aroused-it is the evil of premature and excessive child labor."
is&Ibid., at 21. ,z8
Ibil., at 39.
182 Ibid., at 40.
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The simple and ambiguous commerce clause was thus interpreted by
made-up concepts of equal stature: direct as against indirect; transportation, a current, a flow as against local manufacture. North Dakota could
not impose regulations on grain bought in the state but for shipment and
sale in the Minneapolis market.'5 3 The "course of business ... fixed and
determined the interstate character of the transaction." The federal government could regulate the stockyards, despite the Hopkins case, because
"the stockyards are but a throat through which the current flows, and the
transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current from the
West to the East and from one State to another."'1 4 A strike of coal miners
would not be a matter of interstate commerce, but it could be made so if
intention and plan made it have a "direct, material and substantial effect
to restrain" that commerce. Is s There was, in addition, the category of illicit
commodities, despite the setback of the Child Labor case. The category
would apply when the Court was sufficiently impressed with some evil, occurring perhaps only after the transpoitation had ceased, to think of the
evil in connection with the commodity. Within a year after the Child
Labor case' 86 Justice Day had no difficulty upholding a statute prohibiting the order, purchase, or transportation of intoxicating liquor into a
state where the manufacture or sale of the liquor was against the law. The
federal act went somewhat beyond the state prohibition in some cases, but
this made no difference, for the "control of Congress over interstate commerce is not to be limited by state laws." Liquor for some time had enjoyed membership in the class of suspected commodities. Reasoning by
example might extend the membership.
5 7
The National MotorVehicleTheftAct gave the categorynew meaning.
It made it a criminal offense to transport in interstate commerce a motor
vehicle known to have been stolen. Surely an automobile, even though
stolen, is unobjectionable. The point was urged by counsel for the defendant and with it this statement: "We think that when this Court upheld the
constitutionality of the White Slave Law ... and likewise the Pure Food
and Drug Act... also the Anti-Lottery Act ... it went to the very extreme limit which we may ever expect it to go."' 8 The brief made it clear
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that counsel thought the Court had already gone too far. But it was "altogether too late to argue," the government rejoined, "that while Congress
may forbid under penalty the transportation in interstate commerce of
an unobjectionable woman merely because of immoral purpose of the man
in effecting her transportation, Congress is powerless to close the channels
of such commerce to the transportation of vehicles known to have been
stolen." 8 The Court, through Chief Justice Taft, agreed with the government. The rule was stated broadly: "Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such
commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread
of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin.
In doing this, it is merely exercising the police power for the benefit of the
public within the field of interstate commerce."
The Chief justice showed that the ChildLabor case was different. "Articles made by child labor and transported into other states were harmless,
and could be properly transported, without injuring any person who either
bought or used them." The illicit article cases, on the other hand, were
cases where "the use of interstate commerce had contributed to the accomplishment of harmful results to people of other States, and.., the
congressional power over interstate transportation in such cases could
only be effectively exercised by prohibiting it." In fact, it appeared that
the invention of the automobile itself was to blame:
It is known of all men that the radical change in transportation of persons and goods
effected by the introduction of the automobile, the speed with which it moves, and the
ease with which evil minded persons can avoid capture, have greatly encouraged and
increased crimes. One of the crimes which have been encouraged is the theft of the
automobiles themselves and their immediate transportation to places remote from
homes of the owner. Elaborately organized conspiracies for the theft of automobiles
and the spiriting them away into some other state, and their sale or other disposition
far away from the owner and his neighborhood have aroused Congress to devise some
method for defeating the success of these widely spread schemes of larceny. The quick
passage of the machines into another State helps to conceal the trail of the thieves,
get the stolen property into another jurisdiction and facilitates the finding of a safer
place to which to dispose of the booty at a good price. This is a gross misuse of interstate commerce.

The colorful language was used by a Court which was not liberal in
economic matters. Two years before it had held minimum-wage legislation for women to be contrary to the due process clause.19 ° Commenting
on Justice Clarke's resignation in a letter to him, President Wilson had
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written, "I have been counting on the influence of you and justice Brandeis to restrain the Court in some measure from the extreme reactionary
course which it seemed inclined to follow."'1'9 A depression was arriving.
By 1933 "at least thirteen million persons were unemployed."'192 The
Court permitted Minnesota to grant a mortgage moratorium. 93 It permitted New York to impose a minimum retail price for milk over the unappreciated objection of Justice McReynolds that it was not indicated
"how higher charges at stores to impoverished customers when the output
is excessive and sale prices by producers are unrestrained can possibly increase receipts at the farm."194 The two cases delighted the New Republic.
It commented that "one of the happier by-products of the depression is
the fresh air of realism beginning to blow through the chambers of the
United States Supreme Court."'9 5
But in 1935 the Court proceeded to invalidate particular federal control over oil production., 96 It permitted the federal government to abro-

gate the gold clause in private contracts, but not without the dissent from
Justice McReynolds: "The impending legal and moral chaos is appalling."'' 97 Then in May the act "establishing a compulsory retirement and

pension system for all carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act"
was held unconstitutional. g8 The Act went beyond the permissible regulation of commerce which would be, apparently, the promotion of efficiency or safety in the operation of railroads. Justice Roberts' opinion
boldly discussed matters of policy and psychology, as, for example, what
the reaction of employees would be and whether they would be grateful
to the railroads. Chief Justice Hughes dissented: "The fundamental consideration which supports this type of legislation is that industry should
take care of its human wastage.... The expression of that conviction in
law is regulation. When expressed in the government of interstate commerce, with respect to their employees likewise engaged in interstate commerce, it is a regulation of that commerce." Then applying the test of
,91Baker, Woodrow Wilson 117 (1937), quoted in Frankfurter and Fisher, Business of the
Supreme Court at the October Term 1935-1936, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 577 (x938).
192Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 653
(1946).
'19Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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direct or indirect, the Court held unconstitutional the attempt of the federal government through the NRA to regulate the New York poultry
market. 99 To have permitted directness here would have encroached upon
the states, or, as Justice Cardozo put it, "to find immediacy or directness
here is to find it almost everywhere." President Roosevelt characterized
the decisions as horse-and-buggy day interpretations of the Constitution.
In an atmosphere increasingly tense, Justice Roberts the next year put
the Constitution beside the attempt of the federal government to reduce
farm acreages by rental or benefit payments and found that the latter
did not square with the former. °° While deceptively under the tax power,
the Act was one "regulating agricultural production," and it invaded the
rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. The reasoning
by hypothetical examples was peculiar. The Act was compared to "an appropriation to an educational institution which by its terms is to become
available only if the beneficiary enters into a contract to teach doctrines
°

subversive of the Constitution.20o

Meanwhile, Mr. justice McReynolds permitted the federal government
to make it a crime for a kidnaper to take his victim, in the particular case
a policeman, into interstate commerce.20 '
Two cases presented a striking contrast in the interpretation of the
03
The federal govcommerce clause. The first was the Carter Coal case.2

ernment through the mechanism of a tax and credit system had sought
"to fix the minimum price of coal at each and every coal mine in the United States." Employees were to be given the right to organize and to bargain collectively. The act set maximum hours of labor and minimum
wages. It was held unconstitutional.
The government in its brief described the act as one intended "to remove burdens and obstructions from interstate commerce." The causal
relationship between wages and hours in this industry and interstate commerce was direct. "In many fields, wages constitute over 6oyo of the total
cost of production and the remaining costs consist of .items which offer
little leeway for reductions. 204 But in any event the federal government
could set the terms under which commerce could be used; it could itself
control and restrain commerce. The brief continued:
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Much of the legislation sustained by this Court as an exercise of the commerce
power has, so far from increasing the volume of commerce or providing for its safety,
actually destroyed it by prohibition without in any way tending to increase the volume or promote the safety of commerce in other articles.... It does not say that the
power may be used to insure the safety of individuals traveling in railroad trains, or
to protect the interest of shippers in not having to pay excessive freight rates, or to
preserve the morals of the community by making it unlawful to transport women across
a state line for immoral purposes, or to safeguard the health of the community in
penalizing the shipment in interstate commerce of the pure food or adulterated drugs.
It could have been urged against the Pure Food and Drug Act that its objective
was to promote health and that the Constitution nowhere confers upon the federal
government any power to promote health; it could have been urged against the Mann
White Slave Act that its objective was to promote morality and that the Constitution
nowhere confers upon the federal government the power to promote morality; it
could have been urged against the Motor Theft Act that its objective was to prevent
theft and that the Constitution nowhere confers upon the federal government the
power to prevent breaches of state law. In all of these cases, however, the Acts were
sustained because irrespective of their objective, they were obviously regulations of
commerce; and the fact that their objective was, in one way or another, to promote
the general welfare did not invalidate them as regulations of commerce, but served
rather to explain and justify the regulation.2 s
The brief reminded the Court that "We must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding." "The test laid down by Marshall is thus
not a historical one at all, but rather one which calls for the construction
of the Constitution in the light of current conditions.. .. ,,2o6
The Court said it agreed with the government that "the validity of the
exaction does not rest upon the taxing power but upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." It was "no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states... possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of the states.... Every
journey to a forbidden end begins with the first step." Plainly the incidents
leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal do not constitute "intercourse for the purpose of trade." No distinction was more popular to
the common mind, it said, quoting Kidd v. Pearson,"than that between
manufacture and commerce." It quoted the Knight case: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part of it." "Whether the effect of a
given activity or condition is direct or indirect is not always easy to determine," but it was not a matter of degree. The relationship of employer and
employee was a local one.
20s Ibid., at 127 and 136. At 143, the brief states: "the government has not emphasized or
insisted upon the authority of cases like the Lottery Cases, Hoke v. United States, and Brooks
v. United States because they go beyond what in this case the government is required to sustain."
2o6 Ibid., at 186.
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The second case was Kentucky Whip & Collar."°7 It involved the constitutionality of the Ashurst-Sumners Act which made it unlawful "knowingly to transport in interstate or foreign commerce goods made by convict labor into any State where the goods are intended to be received...
in violation of its laws." The Court held the Act to be constitutional. Its
constitutionality w~s attacked on the ground that the regulation was a
prohibition. "It is well settled.., that no such power to regulate through
prohibition can be exercised with reference to useful and harmless articles
of commerce ....

Congress has no power to look beyond the article it-

self. It can consider only the inherently evil or harmful qualities of the
article itself, or the evil or harmful uses for which it is designed. ' 208 It was
difficult to see any harm in the horse collars and harness which the petitioner manufactured.
But the Court in a unanimous decision responded by showing how Congress might connect the article with an anticipated evil. At a time when
the Court was strained almost to the breaking point against New Deal
legislation, and had refused to see any likelihood of anticipated evil in coal
mined outside of imposed regulations, Chief justice Hughes was able to
write an opinion about convict-made goods which almost pushed the
Child Labor case out of the books.
"The anticipated evil," wrote the Chief Justice, "may proceed from
something inherent in the subject of transportation as in the case of diseased or noxious articles which are unfit for commerce ....

Or the evil

may lie in the purpose of the transportation, as in the case of lottery tickets, or the transportation of women for immoral purposes.... The prohibition may be designed to give effect to the policies of the Congress in
relation to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as in the case of
commodities owned by interstate carriers.... And while the power to
regulate interstate commerce resides in the Congress, which must determine its own policy, the Congress may shape that policy in the light of the
fact that transportation in interstate commerce, if permitted would aid in
the frustration of valid state laws.... ." Motor vehicles were themselves
useful and proper subjects of commerce, but their transportation by one
who knows they have been stolen is "a gross misuse of interstate commerce." Even intoxicating liquors, for that matter, were otherwise legitimate articles of commerce. The Child Labor case was different, for the
"Court concluded that the Act of Congress... had as its aim the placing
of local production under federal control." The category of illicit articles
207
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now converted to one of anticipated evil continued to ride along side of
the equal category of local production. The Carter Coal case was in one;
the Kentucky Whip was in the other.
Kentucky Whip was decided on January 4, 1937. On February 5, President Roosevelt proposed his "reform of the judiciary." The bill would
have added a new justice to the Supreme Court for each new justice over
seventy years of age. The majority of the Court was under great pressure.
Looking back, it appears that controversial issues had made the majority
less amenable to a philosophy of increased government responsibility.
Where the controversy was least, as with stolen automobiles or the products of prison labor, increased powers had been granted, even though the
absence of controversy did not mean that such measures had the approval
of a whole people. These cases would have been persuasive without a dramatic shift in the Court's point of view. In the long run, it seems now that
a shift was inevitable. A written constitution could justify delay; its ambiguous terms could hardly prevent change as people saw problems in a
new light. Causal connections which justified the change might not actually exist. The economic theories expounded by the Government in the
CarterCoal case might be low grade, but they were believed. Education or
the lack of it would change the meaning of words. When the shift came, it
would not even have to be justified by a realignment of cases; reference to
a" rediscovered" Constitution would suffice. The Court-packing plan made
the shift more dramatic, but surely no more decisive than it would have
been. As Professor Beard wrote in July 1936, "It is inconceivable that in
195o the President and the Senate will be able to obtain justices, even
among case-book lawyers who will look at economy and the Constitution
through the eyes of the middle class practitioners of about 1896.11209
March 29, 1937 was the day of the shift. On that day the' Court upheld
the Washington Minimum Wage legislation;210 it stated that it was "unnecessary to cite official statistics to establish what is common knowledge
through the length and breadth of the land." It upheld the Railway Labor
Act and did so in its application to repair-shop employees. The decision
was unanimous. Referring to the pronouncement in the Employers' Liability Cases that back-shop employees were beyond the reach of the commerce power, Justice Stone wrote," Whatever else may be said of that pronouncement, it is obvious that the commerce power is as much dependent
upon the type of regulation as its subject matter. It is enough for present
purposes that experience has shown that the failure to settle by peaceful
2o987 New Republic 317 (July 22, 1936).
210
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means, the grievances of railroad employees with respect to rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions, is far more likely to hinder interstate commerce than the failure to compensate workers who have suffered injury in
21
the course of their employment.) '

The National Lawyers Committee, "organized under the auspices of
the Liberty League and composed of the 58 leading members of the American Bar, had issued a comprehensive report contending that the Wagner
Act was unconstitutional and represented 'a complete departure from our
constitutional and traditional theories of government.' "212 On April 12
the Wagner Labor Relations Act was held constitutional.23 The National
Labor Relations Board had found the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation guilty of unfair labor practices by "discriminating against members of
the union with regard to hire and tenure of employment," and by discharging employees in order to interfere with union organization. The
Chief justice set forth the argument of the company. "The industrial relations and activities in the manufacturing department of respondent's enterprise are not subject to federal regulation. The argument rests upon the
proposition that manufacturing in itself is not commerce." The Government had responded by portraying a stream or flow of commerce through
the manufacturing plant. But it was not necessary to decide the case by
analogy to steam of commerce cases. In contradiction to the language of
the Carter Coal case, "the question is necessarily one of degree." It was decisive that "the stoppage of these operations by industrial strife would
have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce... it is idle to say
that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be
immediate and might be catastrophic."
In May the Alabama Compensation Act2x4 and the Federal Social Security ActIs were upheld. "It is too late today," wrote Justice Cardozo,
"for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme
the use of moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use for a purpose narrower than the promotion of the general welfare." justice McReynolds in his dissent appeared to characterize
the majority opinion as a "cloud of words" and an "ostentatious parade of
irrelevant statistics." Then the term ended. The membership of the Court
began to change. Five new justices were added within three years. The
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Court had been reconstructed. justice Frankfurter later proclaimed the
fact of "an important shift in constitutional doctrine ...

after a recon-

struction in the membership of the Court." But he then said "such shifts
of opinion should not derive from mere private judgment. They must be
duly mindful of the necessary demands of continuity in civilized society.
A reversal of a long current of decisions can be justified only if rooted in
the Constitution itself as an historic document designed for a developing
nation." ' 6 The old categories and the same judicial technique remained.
The registration provisions of the Holding Company Act 7 and the
Filled Milk Act218 were both upheld in 1938. Both of them were based on
the power of the federal government to close the channels of interstate
commerce. Companies which failed to register under the Holding Company Act were denied the use of the mails and the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. The protesting holding company operated through
its system in thirty-two states. Its subsidiaries transmitted energy across
state lines. The lottery, commodity clause, kidnaper, and convict-made
goods cases showed that "When Congress lays down a valid rule to govern
those engaged in interstate commerce, Congress may deny to those who
violate the rule the right to engage in such transactions." The decision
was to have been expected even before the shift.
The same thing could be said of the filled-milk case. The congressional
act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed-milk compounds, with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or
cream. It was clear now that Congress was "free to exclude from interstate commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined
it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or
welfare... or which contravenes the policy of the state of their destination." Affirmative evidence showed "that the use of filled milk as a substitute for pure milk is generally injurious to health and facilitates fraud
on the public." The inquiries of Justice McReynolds into the rational
basis for New Deal legislation had not been popular. It was not clear that
this was a matter for the Court to decide. Yet justice Holmes had inquired
into the rational basis for the Sherman Act; justice Hughes had distinguished the false and fraudulent from the field of speculation. justice
Roberts had discussed the psychology of railroad employees. Now Justice
Stone seemed to agree that such an expert inquiry was proper. "We may
assume for present purposes that no pronouncement of a legislature can
=6
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forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act." Apparently there had to be a rational basis. It was a view from which only Justice
Black dissented.
Mulford v. Smith- 9 showed the shift. As a result of the Butler case, a
new act had been passed which permitted the Secretary of Agriculture to
fix marketing quotas for cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and rice. Justice
Roberts found the Act to be constitutional and did so without any reference to his opinion in the Butlercase. The Pure Food and Drug Act, Mann
Act, stolen automobile, and lottery cases permitted him to say that "Any
rule... to prevent the flow of commerce from doing harm to the people
of the nation, is within the competence of Congress." Here also there was
a "stream of commerce" and a "throat where tobacco enters the stream
of commerce-the marketing warehouse." It did not purport to control
production. The words were the same, but the result was different. Only
the dissent of Justice Butler showed what the relationship used to be. The
Butler case had showed that the Tenth Amendment did not permit Congress to control farm production. Here "punishment for selling is the exact equivalent of punishment for raising the tobacco." This was an absolute prohibition of commerce, and the cases dealing with illicit articles,
adulteration, immoral purposes, stolen automobiles, and kidnapped persons gave "no support to the view that Congress has power generally to
prohibit or limit as it may choose, transportation in interstate commerce
of corn, cotton, rice, tobacco or wheat." The dissent reads like the argument for Carter in the Carter Coal case.
In United States v. Darby"0 the shift resulted in the disavowal of the
Child Labor cases. The Fair Labor Standards Act operated in part through
the prohibition of shipments in interstate commerce of articles manufactured by employees whose wages were less than a minimum or weekly
hours greater than a maximum. The opinion by the Chief Justice made it
clear that it was the Child Labor cases which were wrong, and which not
having been followed, could now be overruled. It was as though there had
been no recent shift but a mistake in 1918. No doubt one could say that
from the lottery cases to the control over the marketing of agricultural
products, there had been a steadily increasing acceptance of government
regulation by prohibition and in this line the Child Labor cases were an exception. But the Court had swung back and forth many times from the
broad view of Gibbons v. Ogden. At a much earlier date Justice Story had
written, "The doctrines and opinions of the 'Old Court' are daily losing
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ground.... The doctrines of the Constitution so vital to the country,
which in former times received the support of the whole Court, no longer
maintain their ascendancy. 22
The reversal of Hammer v. Dagenhart was appropriately accomplished
by reference to the Constitution as a growing instrument, if cases show the
growth. To this extent counsel for both sides should have been pleased.
The government had made a full-dress attack on the meaning of the commerce clause, showing, as it had apparently not realized in prior briefs,
that at the time of the Convention: "Lexicographers, economists and authors used the term 'commerce' to refer not only to the narrow concepts of
sale or exchange, but to include the entire moneyed economy, embracing
production and manufacture as well as exchange." But the government
was also careful to point out that "the men who met in Philadelphia did
not create an instrument fitted to cope only with the exigencies of their
time: they realized that the Constitution must apply in a 'remote futur-

ity' bringing contingencies ... illimitable in their nature ....

"222

Counsel

for Darby stated somewhat frankly that "the Constitution defies logical
analysis" and advocated the use of "'judicial gloss.11223 Preeminent in the
judicial gloss seen by the Court were the cases of illicit articles: intoxicating liquor, white slavery, lottery cases, adulterated articles, stolen articles, kidnaped persons, convict-made goods, and filled milk. These cases
had done their work; perhaps they could now be forgotten, for, as the
Chief Justice said, they pointed to a distinction between things harmful
in themselves or having some deleterious property and other commodities
-a distinction "which was novel when made and unsupported by any
provision of the Constitution." Indeed it was a distinction which had long
been abandoned. Reasoning by example had expanded the category to
include ordinary commodities.
V
The examples which have been used to illustrate the course of legal
reasoning in the fields of case law, statutory, and constitutional interpretation are related. The category of things dangerous in themselves from
the field of case law and the concept of commodities in themselves evil
from the field of constitutional law are in a way the same. White slavery
can be included within them. The history of the gradual growth of the inherently dangerous or evil category is a history of expansion through
2
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reasoning by example until previously innocuous items are included. The
growth is a reflection of a period in which increasing governmental control and responsibility for the individual were thought to be proper. No
one economic or social theory was responsible, although as changes came
about in the manner of living, the social theory moved ahead to explain
and persuade. The social theory then became useful in explaining connections. The point of view of the society changed.2 24 It could not have been
planned; it happened.
The legal theories were not an exact reflection of social theories. The
liability of a seller of a previously innocuous article was not enlarged because some economic theory said this would be appropriate. Rather the
growth of inventions made it hard to distinguish, when reasoning by example was used, between steam engines thought unusual and dangerous
in an early day, and engines that moved and were now commonplace. A
change in the method of selling and in social life made it hard to distinguish between what had once been the small known group around a seller
and the vast outside world. Since the difference could no longer be felt, it
fell away. And similarly in the development of a constitution, increased
transactions and communication made activities previously remote and
local now a matter of national concern. When a wage earner in New York
thought his pay was dependent upon the standard of living in Georgia,
whether it was or not, a fundamental change had taken place.22s And with
the increased concern for what had been remote and local matters, prior
distinctions between neighbors within and without the state began to fall
away.
The emphasis should be on the process. The contrast between logic and
the actual legal method is a disservice to both. Legal reasoning has a logic
of its own. Its structure fits it to give meaning to ambiguity and to test
constantly whether the society has come to see new differences or simi"4 Many were impressed with what they regarded as a new sense of responsibility; see, for
example, Sidney Webb, Social Movements in Cambridge Modem History 765 (i9io): "The
Bolton Cotton spinner of 1842 had no need to keep his children in health, or his house healthy;
his wife could with absolute impunity let the babies die, the whole household was free, in fact
to live practically as it chose, even if it infected and demoralized the neighborhood."
225 United States v. Darby, Brief for United States 58-59: "As the markets of the manufacturers expanded beyond state lines, the technical processes of production acquired a
broader commercial significance. The apprentice to a New York cordwainer in i8oo would
have only a disinterested curiosity in the wages paid the Baltimore apprentice. Today the
worker in a Massachusetts shoe factory knows that his earnings reflect the wage scales in New
York, Georgia, Maine and Missouri. If the result is that the field of congressional regulation
under the commerce clause is enlarged, the cause is not a change in what the Constitution
means, but a recognition of the vast expansion in the number and importance of those intrastate transactions which are now economically inseparable from interstate commerce-of the
unification along national lines of our economic system."
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larities. Social theories and other changes in society will be relevant when
the ambiguity has to be resolved for a particular case. Nor can it be said
that the result of such a method is too uncertain to compel. The compulsion of the law is clear; the explanation is that the area of doubt is constantly set forth. The probable area of expansion or contraction is foreshadowed as the system works. This is the only kind of system which
will work when people do not agree completely. The loyalty of the community is directed toward the institution in which it participates. The
words change to receive the content which the community gives to them.
The effort to find complete agreement before the institution goes to work
is meaningless. It is to forget the very purpose for which the institution of
legal reasoning has been fashioned. This should be remembered as a world
community suffers in the absence of law.

